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  Context	  of	  Oppression	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  the	  direction	  of	  Thomas	  E.	  Hill,	  Jr.)	  	  	  Is	  Kant’s	  duty	  of	  natural	  self-­‐perfection	  a	  moral	  obligation	  for	  individuals	  who	  suffer	  the	  harms	  of	  oppression?	  In	  this	  paper	  I	  argue	  that	  it	  is.	  Understood	  in	  a	  Kantian	  framework,	  the	  project	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  neither	  impossible	  nor	  too	  onerous	  a	  task	  under	  oppression.	  Adopting	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  a	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐respect	  and	  an	  accessible	  and	  morally	  worthy	  means	  of	  resisting	  one’s	  oppression.	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1	  INTRODUCTION	  
	  	   A	  life	  lived	  loafing	  in	  front	  of	  the	  TV	  is	  neither	  happy	  nor	  virtuous.	  Most	  would	  agree	  that	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  to	  make	  something	  of	  oneself.	  No	  matter	  who	  we	  are,	  we	  ought	  to	  cultivate	  the	  skills	  and	  powers	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  fulfill	  our	  goals	  and	  to	  create	  the	  life	  we	  want	  to	  live.	  When	  we	  persistently	  fail	  to	  develop	  ourselves,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  sense	  that	  something	  valuable	  has	  gone	  to	  waste.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  we	  are	  not	  giving	  adequate	  regard	  to	  something	  worthwhile.	  	  We	  all	  have	  that	  friend,	  or	  have	  ourselves	  been	  that	  friend,	  who	  never	  really	  tries.	  A	  “slacker”	  in	  every	  sense	  of	  the	  word,	  she	  is	  content	  not	  developing	  any	  of	  her	  talents	  to	  any	  degree.1	  She	  accepts	  whatever	  the	  circumstances	  make	  of	  her	  abilities.	  She	  lacks	  aspiration,	  has	  no	  desire	  for	  progress,	  and	  tends	  to	  be	  apathetic	  and	  passive	  about	  the	  way	  her	  life	  goes.	  Preferring	  to	  remain	  comfortable,	  she	  regularly	  ignores	  opportunities	  to	  develop	  her	  skills,	  interests,	  and	  talents.	  We	  are	  reluctant	  to	  reproach	  her,	  as	  she	  may	  be	  going	  through	  a	  difficult	  time,	  she	  may	  not	  be	  blameworthy.	  Perhaps	  she	  is	  dealing	  with	  adverse	  circumstances	  beyond	  her	  control.	  Maybe	  her	  passive	  attitude	  is	  a	  response	  to	  social	  injustices	  she	  is	  suffering.	  Still,	  we	  cannot	  help	  but	  feel	  she	  is	  responsible	  for	  some	  moral	  fault-­‐	  not	  regarding	  us,	  her	  friends,	  her	  family,	  God,	  or	  society,	  but	  above	  and	  apart	  from	  all,	  regarding	  herself.	  Even	  if	  our	  friend	  seems	  perfectly	  content	  or	  even	  happy	  in	  her	  ways,	  we	  believe	  she	  is	  somehow	  treating	  herself	  wrongly.	  She	  “can	  do	  better”,	  “is	  worth	  more”,	  she	  “owes	  it	  to	  herself	  to	  try”.	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Johnson,	  “Self-­‐Development	  as	  an	  Imperfect	  Duty”,	  p.	  30.	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The	  intuitions	  I’ve	  described	  are	  very	  much	  in	  line	  with	  Immanuel	  Kant’s	  views.	  In	  the	  Doctrine	  of	  Virtue	  of	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals,	  Kant	  argues	  that	  a	  “human	  being”	  has	  an	  imperfect	  duty	  to	  herself	  to	  “develop	  and	  increase	  [her]	  natural	  perfection”	  (MM	  6:	  444).	  We	  owe	  it	  to	  ourselves	  “not	  to	  leave	  idle…	  rusting	  away	  the	  natural	  predispositions	  and	  capacities	  that	  [our]	  reason	  can	  someday	  use”.	  The	  duty	  is	  fundamentally	  a	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐respect.	  2	  	  To	  respect	  oneself	  as	  a	  human	  being	  with	  an	  autonomous	  will,	  a	  person	  ought	  to	  “develop	  and	  increase”	  her	  rational	  capacities	  “as	  a	  means	  to	  all	  sorts	  of	  possible	  ends”	  (MM	  6:444-­‐5).	  	  Philosophers	  disagree	  over	  whether	  there	  really	  is	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  improve	  oneself.	  Robert	  Paul	  Wolff,	  dismisses	  Kant’s	  duties	  to	  oneself	  for	  being	  deeply	  moralistic.3	  Others,	  like	  Bernard	  Williams,	  Ann	  Cudd,	  Marcus	  Singer,	  and	  Kurt	  Baier,	  dismiss	  the	  idea	  of	  duties	  to	  the	  self	  as	  absurd	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  morality	  only	  governs	  social	  interactions	  between	  individuals	  and	  can	  say	  nothing	  about	  how	  an	  agent	  regards	  herself.4	  Like	  Robert	  Johnson,	  Thomas	  Hill,	  Lara	  Denis,	  Carol	  Hay	  and	  others,	  I	  think	  these	  worries	  need	  not	  be	  serious	  problems	  for	  the	  Kantian.	  However,	  I	  will	  not	  participate	  in	  that	  interesting	  debate	  here.	  Instead,	  in	  this	  paper,	  I	  assume	  that	  Kantian	  duties	  to	  the	  self	  are	  possible	  and	  that	  persons	  in	  general	  owe	  it	  to	  themselves	  to	  adopt	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement.	  Given	  these	  assumptions,	  I	  ask,	  what	  are	  we	  to	  say	  for	  individuals	  living	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression?	  	  	  Initially,	  it	  may	  seem	  that	  circumstances	  of	  oppression	  pose	  a	  problem	  for	  the	  Kantian	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement.	  Philosophers	  who	  work	  on	  oppression	  describe	  oppressed	  persons	  as	  individuals	  who	  are	  systemically	  obstructed,	  materially	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Hill,	  “Imperfect	  Duties	  to	  Oneself”,	  Kant’s	  Tugendlehre,	  299.	  	  
	  3	  Johnson,	  Self-­‐Development	  as	  an	  Imperfect	  Duty,	  p.	  2.	  	  4	  Denis,	  “Kant’s	  Ethics	  and	  Duties	  to	  Oneself”,	  p.	  321.	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psychologically,	  from	  cultivating	  their	  rational	  capacities.	  The	  problem	  is,	  how	  can	  oppressed	  individuals	  be	  obligated	  to	  do	  something	  that	  they	  are	  systemically	  prevented	  from	  doing?	  One	  initially	  plausible	  response	  to	  this	  problem	  is	  to	  argue	  that	  since	  oppression	  deprives	  individuals	  of	  the	  means	  for	  self-­‐improvement,	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  not	  an	  obligation	  for	  oppressed	  individuals	  at	  all.	  Were	  they	  to	  lack	  developed	  human	  capacities,	  it	  would	  be	  no	  moral	  failing.	  5	  This	  paper	  is	  a	  rejection	  of	  this	  kind	  of	  response	  to	  the	  problem	  oppression	  seems	  to	  pose	  to	  the	  Kantian	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement.	  	  Against	  the	  view	  that	  oppressed	  individuals	  can	  commit	  no	  moral	  failing	  in	  regard	  to	  their	  self-­‐improvement,	  I	  argue	  that	  failing	  to	  improve	  one’s	  capacities	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression,	  too,	  is	  a	  failure	  of	  self-­‐respect	  and	  amounts	  to	  allowing	  oneself	  to	  be	  servile.	  As	  such,	  excusing	  the	  oppressed	  from	  cultivating	  their	  abilities	  is	  not	  in	  their	  interest	  or	  the	  interest	  of	  removing	  oppression.	  Making	  an	  exception	  to	  the	  duty	  for	  the	  oppressed	  actually	  denies	  them	  of	  an	  essential	  means	  of	  preserving	  their	  rational	  nature,	  exercising	  their	  autonomy,	  and	  resisting	  their	  oppression.	  I	  want	  to	  show	  that,	  despite	  the	  circumstances	  that	  demoralize	  and	  deprive	  them	  of	  the	  normal	  opportunities	  for	  self-­‐improvement,	  oppressed	  individuals	  can	  cultivate	  themselves	  and	  have	  strong	  and	  unique	  moral	  reasons	  for	  doing	  so.	  Namely,	  by	  cultivating	  their	  capacities	  they	  inevitably	  resist	  their	  oppression	  and	  enhance	  the	  quality	  of	  their	  lives	  even	  while	  suffering	  its	  harms.	  	  	  The	  final	  goal	  of	  this	  paper	  is	  to	  make	  a	  case	  for	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  an	  effective	  and	  accessible	  means	  of	  resisting	  oppression	  and	  as	  the	  morally	  good	  reaction	  to	  one’s	  oppression.	  My	  way	  paves	  a	  middle	  path	  between	  Stoic	  apatheia	  in	  response	  to	  one’s	  oppression	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  reckless	  rebellion	  on	  the	  other.	  Inspired	  by	  the	  life	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Johnson,	  Self-­‐Improvement:	  An	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Frederick	  Douglass,	  I	  suggest	  adopting	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  an	  incremental	  route	  towards	  freedom	  when	  other	  forms	  of	  resistance,	  such	  as	  activism,	  civil	  disobedience,	  and	  opting	  out	  of	  oppressive	  social	  norms	  are	  not	  an	  option.	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2	  SELF-­‐IMPROVEMENT:	  WHAT	  IS	  IT	  AND	  WHY	  IS	  IT	  A	  DUTY?	  	  	   In	  this	  section	  I	  explain	  Kant’s	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement.	  What	  kind	  of	  duty	  is	  it?	  What	  does	  it	  require	  of	  us?	  What	  are	  some	  ways	  one	  might	  fail	  to	  fulfill	  the	  duty?	  Why	  is	  failing	  to	  strive	  for	  self-­‐improvement	  morally	  wrong?	  Why	  is	  striving	  for	  such	  an	  end	  important?	  	  How	  best	  to	  interpret	  Kant	  on	  these	  issues	  is	  tremendously	  controversial.	  Kant’s	  discussion	  in	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  is	  short	  and	  condensed.	  Those	  who	  are	  interested	  in	  the	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  for	  reasons	  other	  than	  historical	  interpretation	  can	  only	  take	  the	  text	  as	  a	  starting	  point.	  Similarly,	  this	  section	  is	  only	  a	  starting	  point.	  I	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  a	  conclusive	  or	  comprehensive	  account	  of	  the	  duty.	  Instead,	  my	  aim	  is	  to	  get	  the	  minimally	  controversial	  basics	  of	  Kant’s	  view	  on	  the	  table	  so	  as	  to	  be	  in	  a	  good	  position	  to	  see	  the	  problem	  posed	  to	  it	  by	  circumstances	  of	  oppression.	  	  Let	  us	  start	  by	  looking	  at	  the	  content	  of	  the	  duty.	  What	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  about?	  What	  are	  we	  being	  asked	  to	  improve?	  In	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  Kant	  describes	  it	  as	  a	  duty	  “to	  develop	  and	  increase	  [one’s]	  natural	  perfection…as	  a	  means	  to	  all	  sorts	  of	  possible	  ends”	  (MM	  6:444).	  A	  human	  being	  “owes	  it	  to	  [herself]…	  not	  to	  leave	  idle”,	  to	  surrender	  her	  life	  to	  comfort	  “rusting	  away	  the	  natural	  predispositions	  and	  capacities	  that	  her	  reason	  can	  some	  day	  use”	  (MM	  6:445).	  We	  can	  understand	  “natural	  perfection”	  and	  “natural	  predispositions	  and	  capacities”	  as	  “any	  capacities	  whatever	  for	  furthering	  ends	  set	  forth	  by	  reason”	  (MM	  6:391).	  Essentially,	  the	  obligation	  is	  to	  develop	  the	  capacities	  (“some	  among	  them	  more	  than	  others,	  insofar	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as	  people	  have	  different	  ends”	  (MM	  6:445))	  that	  will	  help	  us	  pursue	  any	  plans	  and	  goals	  we	  might	  give	  ourselves	  throughout	  the	  course	  of	  our	  lives.	  The	  command	  can	  be	  put	  this	  way:	  “Cultivate	  your	  powers	  of	  mind	  and	  body	  so	  they	  are	  fit	  to	  realize	  any	  ends	  you	  might	  encounter,	  however	  uncertain	  you	  are	  which	  of	  them	  could	  sometime	  become	  yours”	  (MM	  6:392).	  	  Importantly,	  for	  Kant,	  “the	  capacity	  to	  set	  oneself	  an	  end-­‐	  any	  end	  whatsoever-­‐	  is	  what	  characterizes	  humanity”	  (MM	  6:392).	  	  So	  the	  requirement	  to	  cultivate	  our	  capacities	  is	  a	  requirement	  to	  “make	  ourselves	  worthy	  of	  humanity	  by	  culture	  in	  general”	  (MM	  6:392);	  it	  is	  a	  requirement	  to	  live	  up	  to	  our	  worth	  as	  human	  beings	  by	  working	  towards	  the	  plans	  and	  goals	  we	  value	  and	  that	  make	  us	  who	  we	  are.	  	  Kant	  divides	  natural	  capacities	  into	  three	  broad	  kinds:	  First	  are	  the	  powers	  of	  
spirit,	  which	  include	  projects	  like	  mathematics,	  logic,	  philosophy	  and	  various	  other	  intellectual	  pursuits.	  Second	  are	  the	  powers	  of	  soul,	  which	  include	  creative	  capacities	  that	  involve	  memory,	  perception	  and	  imagination,	  such	  as	  various	  arts	  and	  practical	  and	  interpersonal	  skills.	  Third	  are	  powers	  of	  body,	  which	  include	  any	  physical	  activities	  that	  support	  bodily	  health	  and	  functions.	  The	  distinction	  between	  the	  kinds	  of	  capacities	  is	  not	  to	  be	  taken	  too	  rigidly.	  Many	  of	  the	  talents	  and	  activities	  we	  pursue	  involve	  elements	  of	  all	  three	  categories.	  Moreover,	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  a	  holistic	  endeavor	  that	  continues	  over	  the	  course	  of	  life.	  So,	  focusing	  intensely	  on	  developing	  a	  single	  capacity	  and	  neglecting	  all	  others	  is	  not	  a	  way	  to	  fulfill	  the	  duty,	  even	  if	  it	  means	  achieving	  greatness	  in	  that	  one	  capacity.	  Similarly,	  developing	  a	  number	  of	  our	  capacities	  only	  during	  one	  phase	  of	  our	  lives	  is	  not	  a	  way	  to	  fulfill	  the	  duty	  either.	  What	  is	  required	  is	  regular	  life-­‐long	  striving.	  	  	  	  	  Before	  explaining	  what	  the	  duty	  requires	  of	  us	  any	  further,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  preemptively	  squash	  any	  potential	  misunderstandings.	  A	  word	  on	  what	  is	  not	  required	  by	  the	  duty	  is	  in	  order.	  This	  is	  especially	  important	  for	  understanding	  why	  oppressed	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individuals	  can	  fulfill	  the	  duty,	  against	  their	  limitations:	  First,	  we	  are	  not	  obligated	  to	  develop	  every	  capacity	  that	  we	  have,	  or	  even	  every	  capacity	  that	  we	  value.	  While	  Kant	  often	  talks	  of	  developing	  our	  “talents”,	  he	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  we	  are	  obligated	  to	  give	  priority	  specifically	  to	  the	  capacities	  we	  are	  good	  at	  (our	  “gifts”)	  or	  to	  the	  activities	  that	  lead	  most	  effectively	  to	  our	  improvement.	  Neither	  does	  he	  mean	  that	  only	  individuals	  with	  potential	  for	  success	  in	  some	  capacity	  are	  obligated	  to	  cultivate	  themselves.	  I	  can	  choose	  to	  develop	  my	  public	  speaking	  skills,	  even	  though	  speaking	  confidently	  and	  eloquently	  in	  public	  does	  not	  come	  easily	  to	  me,	  even	  though	  my	  upbringing	  may	  have	  discouraged	  and	  barred	  me	  from	  voicing	  my	  opinions,	  and	  even	  though,	  as	  a	  result,	  I	  rarely	  feel	  confidence	  in	  doing	  so.	  It	  is	  not	  something	  I	  have	  a	  special	  knack	  for,	  and	  I	  will	  probably	  never	  become	  a	  great	  orator.	  All	  that	  is	  just	  fine	  for	  Kant.	  It	  does	  not	  count	  against	  me	  if	  my	  progress	  is	  slow,	  meager	  and	  contrary	  to	  my	  natural	  abilities.	  Moreover,	  I	  am	  still	  under	  the	  obligation	  to	  cultivate	  my	  capacities	  even	  if	  there	  is	  nothing	  that	  I	  am	  particularly	  gifted	  at.	  	  Moreover,	  we	  are	  not	  obligated	  to	  develop	  our	  talents	  all	  the	  time,	  every	  time	  we	  have	  the	  opportunity,	  or	  whenever	  we	  are	  not	  fulfilling	  some	  other	  duty.6	  And	  of	  course,	  it	  is	  still	  permissible	  to	  loaf	  when	  appropriate	  (you	  are	  still	  free	  to	  decompress	  by	  watching	  bad	  TV!).	  Contrary	  to	  these	  common	  worries	  about	  the	  view,	  voiced	  by	  many	  including	  Bernard	  Williams	  and	  Susan	  Wolf,	  Lara	  Denis	  has	  argued	  that	  Kant’s	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  does	  not	  necessarily	  make	  an	  agent	  liable	  to	  fanatically	  obsessing	  over	  her	  own	  development	  and	  moral	  purity,	  to	  feeling	  that	  she	  should	  be	  doing	  something	  obligatory	  at	  all	  times,	  or	  to	  living	  in	  constant	  psychological	  tension	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Johnson,	  Self-­‐Improvement:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Kantian	  Ethics,	  p.	  14-­‐42.	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conflict	  with	  her	  desires.7	  This	  is	  in	  part	  supported	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  not	  an	  obligation	  to	  take	  self-­‐perfection	  as	  our	  sole	  and	  primary	  motive	  when	  enjoying	  certain	  activities,	  it	  is	  not	  an	  obligation	  to	  obsessively	  worry	  about	  our	  perfection,	  to	  be	  perfect,	  get	  as	  close	  as	  humanly	  possible	  to	  an	  ideal	  of	  perfection,	  or	  to	  
maximize	  our	  self-­‐improvement.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  Kant	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  we	  are	  not	  obligated	  to	  invest	  all	  or	  even	  most	  of	  our	  time	  working	  on	  our	  talents.	  As	  human	  beings	  we	  are	  limited	  in	  time,	  ability	  and	  energy	  and	  we	  have	  other	  overriding	  needs	  and	  responsibilities	  to	  attend	  to.	  Against	  the	  common	  impression,	  Kant’s	  position	  on	  self-­‐development	  is	  very	  accommodating	  in	  this	  regard.	  	  For	  instance,	  Kant	  makes	  it	  explicit	  that	  the	  capacities	  we	  cultivate	  need	  not	  be	  directly	  related	  to	  our	  moral	  perfection	  (which	  we	  have	  a	  separate	  duty	  to	  ourselves	  to	  cultivate).	  So,	  Kant’s	  argument	  is	  not	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  cultivate	  our	  capacities	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  becoming	  morally	  better	  persons,	  or	  to	  be	  better	  at	  doing	  our	  other	  duties.	  I	  can	  choose	  to	  cultivate	  my	  culinary	  talents	  and	  knack	  for	  Tae	  Kwon	  Do,	  even	  though	  my	  ability	  to	  cook	  and	  break	  boards	  will	  not	  make	  me	  a	  morally	  better	  person	  and	  I	  will	  never	  use	  those	  capacities	  for	  any	  directly	  moral	  purpose.8	  My	  investment	  in	  these	  activities	  for	  their	  own	  sake	  is	  sufficient.	  Hence,	  it	  is	  wrong	  to	  assume,	  as	  many	  do,	  that	  Kant	  took	  every	  action	  to	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  duty,	  or	  that	  Kantian	  agents	  are	  excessively	  preoccupied	  with	  their	  moral	  purity	  and	  perfection.	  In	  fact	  Kant	  called	  this	  kind	  of	  view	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Denis,	  “Kant’s	  Ethics	  and	  Duties	  to	  Oneself”,	  p.	  338-­‐	  343.	  	  8As	  Kant	  says	  in	  the	  Groundwork,	  even	  though	  willing	  to	  neglect	  our	  capacities	  and	  devoting	  our	  lives	  to	  comfort	  passes	  the	  test	  of	  the	  first	  formulation	  of	  the	  categorical	  imperative	  (i.e.	  the	  maxim	  is	  universalizable	  without	  contradiction)	  it	  would	  be	  irrational	  for	  any	  human	  being	  to	  will	  that	  none	  of	  their	  capacities	  be	  developed,	  since	  our	  capacities	  serve	  us	  in	  all	  kinds	  of	  ways	  (body,	  soul,	  and	  spirit).	  Of	  most	  interest	  to	  me	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  willing	  to	  neglect	  our	  capacities	  is	  a	  sign	  of	  diminished	  self-­‐respect.	  That	  is,	  it	  fails	  to	  satisfy	  the	  second	  formulation	  of	  the	  categorical	  imperative.	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“fantastic	  virtue”,	  and	  thought	  it	  was	  a	  deeply	  misguided	  conception	  of	  morality.9	  As	  Johnson	  clarifies,	  “Kant’s	  position…goes	  well	  beyond	  valuing	  natural	  talents	  merely	  as	  instrumental	  for,	  or	  constitutive	  of,	  morally	  good	  character	  or	  the	  performance	  of	  one’s	  moral	  duties.	  [For	  instance,	  the	  third	  of	  the]	  famous	  four	  examples	  in	  the	  
Groundwork…is	  of	  a	  duty	  to	  develop	  talents	  with	  no	  obvious	  connection	  to	  moral	  ends,	  and	  in	  the	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  Kant	  argues	  quite	  explicitly	  for	  a	  duty	  of	  natural	  perfection	  regardless	  of	  its	  role	  in	  moral	  perfection”.10	  The	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  requires	  us	  to	  cultivate	  each	  kind	  of	  capacity	  (soul,	  spirit,	  body)	  in	  whatever	  way	  and	  to	  whatever	  extent	  that	  is	  suitable	  to	  us	  given	  our	  subjective	  circumstances	  (i.e.	  our	  time	  restrictions,	  natural	  abilities,	  relationships	  with	  others,	  social	  class,	  economic	  status,	  race,	  culture,	  genetics,	  dispositions,	  etc.)	  	  and	  the	  kind	  of	  person	  we	  want	  to	  be-­‐	  the	  sort	  of	  life	  we	  value	  and	  desire	  to	  live.	  So,	  if	  I	  value	  running	  and	  set	  a	  goal	  to	  improve	  my	  running	  skills,	  what	  I	  ought	  to	  do	  is	  train	  regularly	  and	  consistently	  challenge	  myself	  in	  my	  training.	  I	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  train	  every	  day,	  and	  I	  may	  not	  ever	  be	  able	  to	  run	  very	  fast,	  and	  I	  may	  find	  running	  extremely	  difficult,	  but	  none	  of	  that	  counts	  against	  fulfilling	  the	  duty.	  What	  is	  required	  is	  that	  I	  set	  the	  goal	  and	  take	  reasonable	  measures	  towards	  achieving	  it,	  without	  compromising	  my	  wellbeing	  and	  my	  obligations	  to	  others.	  Kant	  took	  sincere	  striving	  to	  be	  necessary	  and	  sufficient	  to	  fulfill	  the	  duty,	  regardless	  of	  the	  output	  of	  the	  striving;	  “to	  strive	  with	  all	  one’s	  might…is	  the	  sufficient	  incentive	  of	  every	  action	  conforming	  to	  duty”	  (MM	  6:393).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  “[T]hat	  human	  being	  can	  be	  called	  fantastically	  virtuous	  who	  allows	  nothing	  to	  be	  morally	  
indifferent…	  and	  strews	  his	  steps	  with	  duties,	  as	  with	  man-­‐traps;	  it	  is	  not	  indifferent	  to	  him	  whether	  I	  eat	  meat	  or	  fish,	  drink	  beer	  or	  wine,	  supposing	  that	  both	  agree	  with	  me.	  Fantastic	  virtue	  is	  a	  concern	  with	  petty	  details	  which,	  were	  it	  admitted	  into	  the	  doctrine	  of	  virtue,	  would	  turn	  the	  government	  of	  virtue	  into	  a	  tyranny”	  (MM	  4:409).	  Also	  see	  Denis,	  “Kant’s	  Ethics	  and	  Duties	  to	  Oneself”,	  p.	  339.	  	  	  10	  Johnson,	  “Self-­‐Development	  as	  an	  Imperfect	  Duty”,	  p.	  3;	  G	  4:423.	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It	  follows	  that	  there	  are	  various	  ways	  to	  successfully	  fulfill	  the	  obligation	  of	  self-­‐development.	  A	  lot	  of	  how	  we	  go	  about	  doing	  that	  Kant	  leaves	  up	  to	  us.	  To	  many	  readers,	  this	  might	  seem	  too	  general	  a	  requirement	  to	  be	  duty-­‐like	  in	  any	  way.	  	  So,	  how	  does	  this	  work?	  	  In	  Kant’s	  taxonomy	  of	  duties,	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  classified	  as	  a	  “wide	  and	  
imperfect”	  ethical	  duty	  to	  oneself.11	  As	  a	  “wide	  and	  imperfect”	  duty,	  it	  “determines	  nothing	  about	  the	  kind	  and	  extent	  of	  actions	  themselves	  but	  allows	  latitude	  for	  free	  choice”	  about	  what	  particular	  talents,	  abilities,	  relationships	  and	  interests	  to	  develop,	  when	  to	  develop	  them,	  and	  to	  what	  extent	  (MM	  6:446).12	  	  We	  can	  think	  of	  imperfect	  duties	  in	  contrast	  to	  perfect	  duties:	  imperfect	  duties	  do	  not	  prescribe	  or	  forbid	  particular	  actions	  at	  particular	  times	  as	  perfect	  duties	  do.	  Note	  that	  an	  ‘imperfect’	  duty	  is	  not	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  inferior	  or	  less	  binding	  than	  a	  perfect	  duty.13	  It	  is	  just	  as	  important	  to	  strive	  for	  self-­‐development	  as	  it	  is	  to	  respect	  the	  humanity	  in	  others.	  However,	  perfect	  duties	  have	  priority	  over	  imperfect	  ones;	  they	  are	  overriding	  and	  draw	  the	  limits	  for	  what	  actions	  are	  morally	  permissible.	  This	  means	  that	  I	  am	  not	  permitted	  to	  seek	  self-­‐improvement	  by	  harming	  myself,	  deceiving,	  disrespecting	  or	  manipulating	  others,	  regardless	  of	  the	  outcome.	  Hence,	  producing	  great	  works	  of	  art	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  abandoning	  one’s	  family,	  as	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  painter	  Gauguin	  in	  the	  famous	  paper	  by	  Bernard	  Williams,	  does	  not	  count	  towards	  fulfilling	  the	  duty,	  even	  if	  it	  means	  the	  greatest	  of	  cultural	  treasures	  will	  come	  to	  fruition.	  	  Like	  other	  ethical	  duties	  pertaining	  to	  the	  “doctrine	  of	  ends”	  (i.e.	  The	  Doctrine	  of	  
Virtue),	  the	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  a	  duty	  to	  adopt	  self-­‐development	  as	  an	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  G	  4:421-­‐23;	  MM	  6:445-­‐46	  
12Johnson,	  “Self-­‐Development	  as	  an	  Imperfect	  Duty	  to	  Oneself”,	  p.6.	  	  	  13	  Johnson,	  Self-­‐Improvement:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Kantian	  Ethics,	  p.	  17.	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obligatory	  end-­‐	  a	  policy,	  principle,	  aim,	  maxim	  or	  guiding	  rational	  for	  action.	  Kant	  calls	  it	  an	  “end	  that	  is	  also	  a	  duty”	  (MM	  6:392).	  I	  have	  successfully	  adopted	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  when	  I	  genuinely	  think	  of	  myself	  as	  someone	  with	  capacities,	  talents,	  and	  interests	  worth	  cultivating	  and	  when	  that	  self-­‐regarding	  attitude	  is	  appropriately	  reflected	  in	  my	  plans	  and	  actions.14	  Thus,	  adopting	  the	  end	  entails	  having	  certain	  attitudes	  and	  dispositions	  for	  action	  (though,	  it	  does	  not	  count	  against	  me	  if	  I	  am	  never	  successful	  in	  action	  due	  to	  external	  constraints).	  	  A	  distinguishing	  feature	  of	  the	  duties	  to	  oneself	  is	  that	  they	  are	  not	  owed	  to	  anyone	  but	  one’s	  self.	  When	  I	  fail	  to	  fulfill	  a	  duty	  I	  owe	  someone	  else,	  for	  instance	  by	  cheating	  them	  in	  a	  business	  deal,	  the	  person	  I	  cheat	  has	  a	  right	  to	  protest	  against	  me	  and	  perhaps	  to	  seek	  compensation	  for	  my	  acts.	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  owe	  it	  to	  anyone	  but	  myself	  to	  cultivate	  my	  talents,	  capacities	  and	  interests.	  So,	  it	  is	  no	  one’s	  business	  to	  take	  a	  moral	  (let	  alone	  moralistic)	  interest	  in	  my	  self-­‐development.	  My	  friends	  and	  family	  can	  motivate	  and	  encourage	  me	  and	  set	  up	  favorable	  conditions	  for	  my	  development,	  but	  no	  one	  is	  responsible	  for	  my	  improvement,	  and	  no	  one	  can	  reproach	  me,	  blame	  me,	  or	  impose	  sanctions	  on	  me	  when	  I	  do	  not	  develop	  my	  capacities.	  I	  am	  the	  only	  person	  with	  the	  right	  to	  complain	  or	  pass	  judgment	  on	  how	  I	  treat	  myself	  in	  regards	  to	  my	  development.15	  As	  Kant	  says,	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  “something	  that	  only	  the	  other	  himself	  can	  do”	  (MM	  6:386.).	  Others	  may	  feel	  upset	  or	  disappointed	  when	  I	  do	  not	  cultivate	  myself,	  but	  I	  cannot	  wrong	  anyone	  but	  myself	  in	  this	  regard.	  Not	  only	  is	  self-­‐development	  not	  owed	  to	  anyone	  but	  oneself,	  but	  Kant	  also	  stresses	  that	  it	  is	  not	  something	  we	  should	  aspire	  to	  only	  ins	  so	  far	  as	  it	  enables	  us	  to	  fulfill	  our	  obligations	  to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Hill,	  “Imperfect	  Dutie	  to	  Oneself”,	  Kant’s	  Tugendlehre,	  p.	  297.	  	  	  15	  Hill,	  “Imperfect	  Duties	  to	  Oneself”,	  Kant’s	  Tugendlehre,	  p.	  297.	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others.	  “Self-­‐improvement	  is	  a	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐respect,	  not	  just	  prudence	  or	  service	  to	  others”.16	  For	  Kant,	  all	  ethical	  duties	  are	  grounded	  in,	  or	  gain	  their	  authority	  from	  and	  are	  meant	  to	  preserve	  and	  uplift	  the	  value	  of	  human	  dignity.	  In	  Kant’s	  words,	  they	  have	  their	  source	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  humanity	  in	  each	  person	  is	  an	  end	  in	  itself	  (the	  Humanity	  Formula).17	  As	  an	  ethical	  duty	  owed	  to	  oneself,	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  grounded	  in	  the	  humanity	  in	  one’s	  own	  person.	  It	  is	  an	  obligation	  to	  treat	  one’s	  own	  person	  with	  respect	  in	  regards	  to	  one’s	  ends	  and	  capacities.	  So	  cultivating	  our	  capacities	  is	  an	  important	  method	  of	  valuing	  and	  respecting	  one’s	  relationship	  with	  oneself.	  It	  is	  a	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐respect	  and	  self-­‐esteem.	  That	  is	  fundamentally	  what	  makes	  it	  so	  important	  to	  thinking	  about	  cases	  of	  oppression.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  As	  I	  hope	  to	  show	  in	  the	  sections	  to	  follow,	  the	  Kantian	  conception	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  especially	  important	  when	  thinking	  about	  cases	  of	  oppression	  because	  it	  is	  a	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐respect	  and	  essential	  to	  an	  agent’s	  understanding	  of	  herself	  as	  a	  worthy	  human	  being	  capable	  of	  autonomous	  action.	  Self-­‐respecting	  agents	  are	  agents	  that	  set	  themselves	  ends	  and	  cultivate	  capacities	  and	  skills	  that	  will	  help	  them	  to	  reach	  those	  goals.	  Doing	  so	  enhances	  their	  positive	  self-­‐regard	  and	  their	  ability	  to	  act	  autonomously.	  As	  such,	  the	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  a	  pillar	  supporting	  autonomous	  action.	  If	  I	  do	  not	  regard	  myself	  as	  having	  capacities	  worth	  cultivating,	  I	  lack	  an	  adequate	  sense	  of	  self-­‐worth	  and	  I	  will	  be	  unlikely	  to	  act	  on	  ends	  that	  I	  set	  for	  myself.	  I	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  servile,	  passive,	  to	  lack	  self-­‐trust	  and	  to	  defer	  to	  the	  expectations	  of	  others,	  never	  to	  form	  my	  own	  plans,	  cultivating	  the	  capacities	  and	  ends	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Hill,	  “Imperfect	  Duties	  to	  Oneself”,	  Kant’s	  Tugendlehre,	  p.	  299.	  	  17	  Johnson	  has	  an	  interesting	  discussion	  about	  whether	  the	  duty	  can	  be	  grounded	  in	  the	  first	  formulation	  of	  the	  Categorical	  Imperative	  alone	  as	  Kant	  seems	  to	  suggest	  it	  can.	  Johnson	  concludes	  that	  it	  cannot	  and	  that	  the	  second	  formulation	  is	  necessary	  to	  ground	  the	  duty.	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that	  my	  family,	  religion,	  or	  society	  set	  for	  me,	  even	  when	  they	  do	  not	  actually	  promote	  my	  autonomy	  and	  wellbeing.	  	  If	  this	  happens	  regularly	  over	  time,	  if	  for	  whatever	  reason	  (perhaps	  due	  to	  oppressive	  circumstances)	  I	  am	  unable	  to	  regard	  myself	  as	  having	  capacities	  worth	  cultivating	  independently	  of	  their	  benefitting	  others,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  sense	  in	  which	  I	  become	  passive	  and	  servile	  to	  my	  circumstances,	  instead	  of	  active	  and	  creative	  in	  my	  striving	  to	  bring	  about	  my	  autonomous	  goals.	  My	  inability	  to	  strive	  for	  improvement	  is	  a	  sign	  that	  my	  autonomy	  is	  impaired	  or	  at	  least	  that	  it	  is	  not	  being	  exercised.18	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Moreover,	  I	  think	  this	  duty	  is	  important	  because	  as	  Carol	  Hay	  argues,	  certain	  forms	  of	  oppression,	  such	  as	  gendered	  self-­‐sacrifice,	  cannot	  be	  understood	  to	  be	  wrong	  without	  an	  account	  of	  duties	  to	  oneself	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  self-­‐respect.	  Kant’s	  ethics	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  gives	  self-­‐regarding	  duties	  a	  central	  role.	  Other	  ethical	  theories,	  such	  as	  care	  ethics,	  may	  not	  be	  able	  to	  give	  an	  adequate	  account	  of	  why	  gendered	  self-­‐sacrifice	  is	  wrong	  when	  it	  does	  not	  compromise	  the	  wellbeing	  of	  others	  and	  our	  ability	  to	  care	  for	  them	  in	  any	  obvious	  way.	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3	  THE	  NATURE	  OF	  OPPRESSION	  
	   	  
Defining	  Oppression	  
	   Oppression	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  obstruct	  or	  prevent	  a	  person’s	  self-­‐improvement.	  Ages	  before	  talk	  of	  oppression	  became	  fashionable,	  J.S	  Mill	  certainly	  seems	  to	  have	  this	  in	  mind.	  In	  his	  foundational	  essay	  The	  Subjection	  of	  Women,	  Mill	  states,	  “the	  legal	  subordination	  of	  one	  sex	  to	  the	  other…is	  wrong	  in	  itself,	  and…	  one	  of	  the	  chief	  hindrances	  to	  human	  improvement”.19	  On	  one	  interpretation	  of	  Mill’s	  view,	  what	  we	  today	  would	  call	  oppression	  is	  fundamentally	  the	  denial	  of	  equal	  liberty	  to	  develop	  one’s	  rational	  capacities	  for	  thought	  and	  action.	  20	  	  	  Expanding	  on	  Mill’s	  foundation,	  Hay,	  Cudd,	  and	  Frye	  have	  a	  similar	  understanding	  of	  oppression.	  They	  describe	  oppressed	  persons	  as	  individuals	  who	  are	  institutionally	  denied	  the	  liberty	  and	  opportunities	  to	  cultivate	  their	  rational	  capacities	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  membership	  in	  a	  group	  of	  low	  social	  esteem.	  The	  examples	  of	  oppressed	  persons	  that	  most	  easily	  come	  to	  mind	  are	  women,	  African	  Americans,	  people	  of	  color	  and	  other	  minority	  and	  ethnic	  groups.	  I	  also	  include	  some	  non-­‐traditional	  candidates	  of	  oppression:	  the	  impoverished,	  the	  physically	  disabled,	  the	  LBTGQ	  community,	  and	  individuals	  living	  in	  societies	  where	  there	  is	  war	  or	  severe	  political	  corruption.	  In	  many	  cases,	  these	  persons	  suffer	  the	  same	  kinds	  of	  group-­‐specific	  limitations	  on	  their	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  traditional	  subjects	  of	  race	  or	  gender	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Mill,	  The	  Subjection	  of	  Women,	  125;	  Hay,	  Kantianism	  Liberalism,	  Feminism:	  Resisting	  
Oppression,	  2.	  	  20	  Hay,	  Kantianism	  Liberalism,	  Feminism:	  Resisting	  Oppression,	  2.	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based	  oppression	  do.	  In	  any	  case,	  what	  all	  oppressed	  people	  have	  in	  common	  is	  that	  they	  suffer	  unjust,	  group-­‐specific	  harm.	  The	  harms	  of	  oppression	  are	  imposed	  systemically	  (by	  institutions),	  through	  psychological	  and	  intellectual	  inhibitions	  as	  well	  as	  material	  limitations	  on	  resources	  and	  opportunities	  for	  self-­‐improvement.	  	  Cudd	  puts	  it	  this	  way.	  Oppression	  is	  “an	  institutionally	  structured	  harm	  perpetrated	  on	  groups	  by	  other	  groups	  using	  direct	  and	  indirect	  material	  and	  psychological	  forces	  that	  violate	  justice…These	  forces	  work	  in	  part	  by	  coercing	  the	  oppressed	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  further	  their	  own	  oppression”.21	  Oppression	  is	  necessarily	  a	  social	  injustice	  imposed	  by	  social	  groups	  on	  other	  social	  groups.	  However,	  it	  plays	  out	  in	  individuals.22	  So,	  while	  social	  groups	  are	  the	  subjects	  of	  oppression,	  “it	  is	  fundamentally	  the	  individuals	  in	  those	  groups	  who	  suffer…though	  they	  can	  only	  do	  so	  as	  members	  of	  social	  groups”.23	  	  	  	  One	  basic	  feature	  of	  oppression	  is	  that	  it	  tends	  to	  involve	  some	  kind	  of	  imposition	  or	  coercion,	  although	  in	  some	  cases,	  Cudd	  argues,	  one	  can	  enter	  into	  an	  oppressive	  relationship	  by	  choice.	  In	  most	  cases	  oppression	  is	  unavoidable	  because	  you	  are	  born	  into	  it.	  Its	  harms	  are	  imposed	  on	  you	  for	  being	  who	  you	  are-­‐	  for	  having	  a	  group	  identity	  that	  you	  cannot	  easily	  deny,	  such	  as	  your	  gender,	  sexual	  orientation,	  ethnicity,	  physical	  ability,	  economic	  status,	  or	  race.	  	  Oppression	  is	  self-­‐perpetuating.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  subjects	  of	  oppression	  often	  feel	  compelled	  to	  play	  along	  with	  their	  oppression.	  Oppressed	  persons	  appear	  to	  consent	  to	  their	  subordination,	  even	  coming	  to	  identify	  with	  it,	  and	  desiring	  it	  to	  continue.	  This	  is	  because	  oppression	  works	  in	  part	  by	  creating	  incentives	  for	  oppressed	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Cudd,	  Analyzing	  Oppression,	  26.	  	  	  22	  Cudd,	  Analyzing	  Oppression,	  22.	  	  	  	  23	  Cudd,	  Analyzing	  Oppression,	  23.	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persons	  to	  have	  false	  beliefs	  about	  themselves,	  their	  abilities,	  and	  their	  status	  in	  society	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  others.	  Oppressed	  persons	  tend	  to	  believe	  that	  their	  exploitation	  is	  valuable	  and	  good,	  even	  commanded	  by	  god	  or	  essential	  for	  social	  cohesion	  or	  tradition.	  Oppressed	  persons	  tend	  to	  interpret	  their	  experiences	  of	  being	  subordinated	  as	  natural	  and	  deserved.	  As	  a	  result,	  oppressed	  persons	  are	  socialized	  to	  treat	  themselves	  and	  other	  members	  of	  their	  social	  group	  as	  having	  less	  credibility,	  power,	  potential	  and	  respect-­‐worthiness	  than	  members	  of	  privileged	  groups.	  In	  addition	  having	  less	  freedom,	  rights	  and	  opportunities	  as	  privileged	  individuals,	  the	  oppressed	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  more	  inhibited	  in	  their	  social	  interactions.	  It	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  their	  oppression	  that	  they	  tend	  to	  be	  excessively	  self-­‐doubtful,	  anxious,	  hesitant	  and	  fearful.	  They	  expect	  to	  be	  misunderstood,	  chastised,	  distrusted	  and	  ignored	  by	  others	  and	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  see	  that	  kind	  of	  treatment	  as	  deserved	  or	  appropriate-­‐	  as	  somehow	  caused	  or	  provoked	  by	  them	  and	  their	  inadequacies.	  As	  a	  result,	  oppressed	  persons	  tend	  to	  lack	  self-­‐trust.	  They	  tend	  to	  be	  guarded,	  reticent,	  self-­‐censoring	  and	  self-­‐deprecating.	  The	  hallmark	  of	  oppression	  is	  that	  it	  literally	  turns	  the	  individual	  against	  herself.	  She	  becomes	  her	  own	  oppressor.	  	  Following	  Cudd	  and	  Frye,	  Hay	  concisely	  summarizes	  oppression	  as	  involving	  the	  following	  four	  “individually	  necessary	  and	  jointly	  sufficient”	  conditions	  for	  oppression.24	  	  	  An	  individual	  is	  subject	  to	  oppression	  if:	  	  1. She	  is	  harmed	  in	  virtue	  of	  being	  a	  member	  of	  group	  G;	  and,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Hay,	  Kantianism,	  Liberalism,	  Feminism:	  Resisting	  Oppression,	  6.	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2. On	  balance,	  members	  of	  G	  have	  a	  relative	  lack	  of	  social	  esteem,	  power	  or	  authority;	  and,	  	  3. On	  balance,	  members	  of	  another	  group,	  G*,	  benefit	  from	  her	  being	  harmed,	  and,	  	  	  4. This	  harm	  is	  unfair,	  unearned,	  or	  illegitimate	  in	  some	  other	  way.25	  	  	  Hay’s	  conditions,	  above,	  closely	  correspond	  to	  Cudd’s	  conditions	  for	  oppression:	  	  1. The	  harm	  condition:	  There	  is	  a	  harm	  that	  comes	  out	  of	  an	  institutional	  practice.	  	  2. The	  social	  group	  condition:	  The	  harm	  is	  perpetuated	  through	  a	  social	  institution	  or	  practice	  on	  a	  social	  group	  whose	  identity	  exists	  apart	  from	  the	  oppressive	  harm	  in	  1.	  	  3. The	  privilege	  condition:	  There	  is	  another	  social	  group	  that	  benefits	  from	  the	  institutional	  practice	  in	  1.	  	  4. The	  coercion	  condition:	  There	  is	  unjustified	  coercion	  or	  force	  that	  brings	  about	  the	  harm.	  	  	   Notice	  that	  Hay	  replaces	  Cudd’s	  coercion	  condition	  with	  a	  weaker	  claim	  that	  leaves	  more	  room	  for	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  the	  oppressed	  person.	  It	  is	  generally	  agreed	  that	  if	  an	  unjust	  social	  harm	  is	  forced	  upon	  me,	  I	  am	  not	  responsible	  for	  it	  and	  cannot	  stop	  it.	  But	  if	  the	  harm	  I	  suffer	  is	  “unfair,	  unearned	  or	  illegitimate”,	  while	  it	  still	  could	  be	  forced	  upon	  me,	  it	  does	  not	  have	  to	  be.	  Moreover,	  I	  could	  still	  be	  guilty	  for	  being	  passive	  or	  for	  playing	  into	  the	  harm	  and	  I	  could	  still	  have	  an	  obligation	  to	  myself	  to	  resist	  it.	  Cudd,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  is	  a	  contractarian.	  She	  holds	  that	  while	  it	  is	  good	  for	  the	  oppressed	  to	  try	  to	  do	  something	  about	  their	  oppression	  and	  to	  try	  to	  cultivate	  their	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capacities,	  they	  do	  not	  owe	  it	  to	  themselves	  to	  do	  so.	  Resistance	  and	  self-­‐improvement,	  for	  Cudd,	  can	  only	  be	  an	  obligation	  owed	  to	  other	  oppressed	  persons.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  Hay,	  as	  I	  do,	  maintains	  that	  oppressed	  persons	  first	  and	  foremost	  owe	  it	  to	  themselves	  to	  do	  something	  about	  their	  oppression.	  However,	  while	  both	  Hay	  and	  Cudd	  focus	  directly	  on	  the	  obligation	  to	  resist	  oppression,	  I	  identify	  a	  specific	  and	  subtle	  kind	  of	  resistance.	  That	  is,	  resistance	  through	  self-­‐improvement.	  Self-­‐improvement	  is	  an	  obligation	  whether	  or	  not	  your	  circumstances	  fulfill	  all	  four	  conditions	  of	  oppression.	  It	  is,	  generally	  speaking,	  someone	  you	  owe	  yourself	  regardless	  of	  your	  circumstances	  (so	  long	  as	  you	  possess	  rational	  capacities).	  However,	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression,	  self-­‐improvement	  inevitably	  takes	  the	  form	  of	  resistance.	  This	  is	  because,	  as	  I	  have	  defined	  it,	  oppression	  is	  fundamentally	  an	  effort	  to	  inhibit	  and	  manipulate	  certain	  people	  away	  from	  self-­‐improvement.	  So,	  when	  these	  people	  cultivate	  their	  human	  capacities,	  even	  if	  they	  never	  actualize	  their	  potentials,	  even	  if	  they	  are	  never	  successful,	  they	  are	  still	  resisting	  merely	  by	  adopting	  the	  end.	  While	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  fight	  oppression,	  and	  may	  not	  seem	  like	  resistance	  at	  all	  to	  the	  oppressed	  person	  who	  adopts	  it	  as	  an	  end,	  it	  is	  still	  effective	  and	  accessible	  as	  a	  way	  for	  oppressed	  individuals	  to	  do	  something	  about	  their	  circumstances.	  It	  is	  the	  means	  to	  make	  something	  better	  out	  of	  life	  under	  oppression.	  By	  cultivating	  their	  human	  capacities	  they	  preserve	  their	  self-­‐respect,	  and	  protect	  their	  ability	  to	  determine	  for	  themselves	  what	  sort	  of	  person	  they	  want	  to	  be	  and	  what	  ends	  they	  want	  to	  pursue.	  	  	  	  I	  will	  not	  elaborate	  in	  detail	  on	  each	  of	  Hay	  and	  Cudd’s	  conditions	  for	  oppression	  since	  readers	  can	  refer	  directly	  to	  them	  on	  the	  matter.	  However,	  I	  think	  it	  will	  help	  to	  highlight	  the	  following	  about	  Hay’s	  conditions	  in	  particular	  (these	  highlights	  will	  apply	  just	  as	  well	  to	  Cudd’s).	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First,	  Hay’s	  fourth	  condition	  entails	  that	  oppression	  always	  signifies	  a	  wrong.	  There	  are	  various	  kinds	  of	  social	  harms,	  not	  all	  are	  morally	  wrong	  or	  unjust.	  Incarceration	  is	  a	  social	  harm,	  but	  if	  the	  incarcerated	  individual	  is	  a	  mass	  murder,	  then	  incarceration	  is	  justified.	  	  War	  is	  a	  social	  harm,	  but	  if	  it	  is	  truly	  fought	  in	  self-­‐defense	  then	  arguably	  the	  harm	  is	  excused.	  However,	  no	  one	  would	  be	  compelled	  to	  say	  that	  the	  mass	  murderer	  or	  the	  aggressive	  side	  in	  a	  just	  war	  is	  being	  oppressed.	  This	  is	  because	  what	  makes	  oppression	  distinct	  as	  a	  social	  harm	  is	  that	  it	  is	  always	  unjust	  and	  inexcusable.	  Describing	  a	  social	  harm	  as	  just	  or	  excused	  is	  to	  say	  that	  it	  is	  not	  oppression.	  	  Second,	  Hay’s	  second	  condition	  implies	  that	  not	  every	  social	  group	  is	  one	  whose	  members	  can	  be	  oppressed.	  It	  is	  only	  groups	  whose	  members	  are	  given	  relatively	  low	  esteem,	  power	  and	  authority	  in	  society	  who	  can	  count	  as	  oppressed	  individuals.	  So,	  despite	  recent	  efforts	  to	  make	  such	  an	  argument	  against	  feminism,	  white	  men	  in	  our	  current	  society	  in	  America	  cannot	  be	  subject	  to	  oppression	  because	  their	  social	  group	  has	  historically	  had	  power,	  high	  esteem,	  and	  authority	  in	  society.	  Moreover,	  following	  condition	  3,	  there	  exists	  no	  group	  G*	  that	  benefits	  from	  denying	  them	  incentives	  and	  opportunities	  for	  the	  cultivation	  of	  their	  capacities	  because	  of	  their	  identity	  as	  white	  males.	  	  Third,	  Hay’s	  first	  condition	  stresses	  that	  the	  harms	  of	  oppression	  are	  necessarily	  
group	  specific.	  That	  is,	  they	  are	  directed	  at	  individuals	  in	  virtue	  of	  their	  membership	  in	  a	  social	  group.	  In	  particular,	  it	  must	  be	  a	  group	  systemically	  given	  low	  esteem,	  credibility	  and	  power	  in	  society.	  For	  instance,	  African	  Americans	  and	  women	  were,	  and	  in	  some	  places	  around	  the	  world	  still	  are,	  historically	  denied	  the	  right	  to	  vote	  because	  they	  were	  black	  or	  female.	  And	  being	  black	  or	  female	  was	  tantamount	  to	  being	  less	  intelligent,	  less	  capable,	  less	  worthy	  of	  respect,	  less	  important.	  Since	  oppression	  is	  directed	  at	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individuals	  for	  their	  membership	  in	  a	  social	  group,	  a	  social	  harm	  suffered	  for	  breaking	  a	  law	  (assuming	  it	  is	  just),	  is	  not	  a	  harm	  of	  oppression.	  Whereas,	  a	  social	  harm	  inflicted	  merely	  for	  having	  an	  identity	  of	  low	  social	  credibility	  and	  esteem-­‐	  for	  instance,	  the	  legal	  prohibition	  of	  females	  from	  driving	  in	  Saudi	  Arabia,	  or,	  how	  in	  many	  countries	  in	  the	  Middle	  East,	  a	  rapist	  can	  get	  out	  of	  legal	  punishment	  by	  marrying	  his	  victim,	  or,	  how	  in	  Sharia	  court	  a	  woman’s	  testimony	  is	  made	  equal	  to	  half	  of	  a	  man’s-­‐	  is	  oppressive	  harm	  because	  it	  is	  blatantly	  group	  specific.	  	  	  	  	  
Self-­‐improvement	  as	  an	  obligation	  to	  oneself	  	  
	   I	  disagree	  fundamentally	  with	  Cudd	  on	  this	  point-­‐	  the	  point	  that	  the	  oppressed	  person	  can	  only	  owe	  it	  to	  other	  oppressed	  persons,	  and	  not	  also	  to	  herself,	  to	  cultivate	  her	  human	  capacities.	  There	  are	  a	  couple	  of	  reasons	  for	  my	  disagreement.	  First,	  imagine	  an	  oppressed	  individual,	  say,	  someone	  like	  Hill's	  Deferential	  Wife	  character.	  She	  has	  done	  everything	  necessary	  to	  fulfill	  her	  duties	  to	  others	  and	  spends	  ample	  time	  and	  energy	  developing	  her	  capacities,	  but	  focuses	  entirely	  on	  developing	  the	  capacities	  that	  others-­‐	  her	  husband,	  her	  children,	  her	  family,	  friends,	  society,	  religion-­‐	  have	  chosen	  for	  her	  and	  that	  benefit	  them	  in	  some	  way.	  She	  goes	  well	  beyond	  what	  is	  morally	  required	  in	  helping	  others	  to	  develop	  their	  talents,	  donating	  to	  charities,	  helping	  others	  with	  everyday	  tasks,	  finding	  them	  studio	  space,	  coaches,	  teachers,	  playing	  fields,	  and	  so	  on.26	  Now,	  she	  is	  not	  at	  fault	  for	  not	  developing	  her	  capacities	  at	  all,	  as	  a	  couch	  potato	  or	  Johnson’s	  Ne’er	  Do	  Well	  is,	  since	  in	  order	  to	  do	  all	  this	  she	  must	  cultivate	  the	  capacities	  that	  allow	  her	  to	  help	  others.	  However,	  by	  neglecting	  to	  choose	  for	  herself	  which	  capacities	  to	  cultivate	  independently	  of	  how	  they	  serve	  others,	  she	  does	  not	  genuinely	  adopt	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  and	  is	  lacking	  in	  self-­‐respect.	  The	  Deferential	  Wife	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Johnson,	  Self-­‐Improvement:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Kantian	  Ethics,	  40.	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falls	  clearly	  under	  Johnson’s	  Self-­‐Sacrificer	  example.	  As	  Johnson	  puts	  it,	  the	  Self-­‐Sacrificer	  is	  at	  fault	  because	  she	  treats	  herself	  and	  her	  capacities	  “as	  a	  mere	  means	  to	  the	  development	  of	  others”.27	  While	  it	  is	  good	  that	  she	  is	  helpful	  to	  others,	  in	  order	  to	  fulfill	  her	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement,	  she	  ought	  to	  treat	  herself	  as	  an	  end	  and	  do	  something	  for	  her	  own	  development.	  To	  tie	  this	  back	  to	  Cudd’s	  insistence	  on	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  a	  duty	  we	  can	  only	  owe	  to	  others,	  think	  of	  an	  analogous	  case.	  Call	  her	  the	  Deferential	  Activist	  (or	  Self-­‐Sacrificing	  Activist).	  The	  Deferential	  Activist	  does	  everything	  she	  can	  for	  her	  cause.	  She	  cultivates	  the	  capacities	  of	  other	  oppressed	  individuals	  and	  helps	  to	  liberate	  them	  from	  their	  oppression.	  However,	  she	  neglects	  to	  do	  anything	  about	  her	  own	  situation.	  She	  only	  cultivates	  the	  capacities	  that	  help	  her	  further	  the	  interests	  of	  other	  oppressed	  persons.	  On	  Cudd’s	  account,	  the	  Deferential	  Activist	  exhibits	  no	  moral	  failing;	  she	  fulfills	  all	  her	  duties	  to	  others,	  including	  her	  duty	  to	  resist	  oppression	  for	  their	  sake-­‐	  she	  helps	  them	  resist	  their	  oppression.	  She	  educates	  them	  about	  the	  harms	  of	  oppression,	  empowers	  them,	  gives	  them	  opportunities	  for	  self-­‐improvement	  by	  arranging	  book	  clubs,	  sports	  teams,	  exhibition	  spaces,	  poetry	  readings	  and	  so	  on.	  Exactly	  like	  Johnson’s	  Self-­‐Sacrificer,	  the	  Deferential	  Activist	  is	  not	  at	  fault	  for	  having	  no	  developed	  capacities.	  Rather,	  like	  the	  Self-­‐Sacrificer,	  she	  treats	  her	  capacities	  as	  a	  means	  for	  other’s	  development	  and	  resistance	  to	  oppression.	  She	  does	  not	  develop	  any	  of	  her	  own	  capacities	  and	  interests	  unless	  they	  benefit	  others	  and	  the	  cause	  she	  works	  for.	  So	  while	  she	  is	  a	  good	  person	  in	  many	  respects,	  she	  still	  lacks	  the	  self-­‐respect	  that	  she	  helps	  others	  to	  develop	  and	  fails	  to	  genuinely	  adopt	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement.	  	  Because	  of	  these	  cases,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  especially	  important	  to	  understand	  self-­‐improvement	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression	  as	  a	  duty	  to	  oneself.	  Variations	  on	  Johnson’s	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Johnson,	  Self-­‐Improvement:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Kantian	  Ethics,	  40.	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Self-­‐Sacrificer	  are	  bound	  to	  be	  very	  common	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression.	  We	  can	  all	  think	  of	  such	  people	  in	  our	  lives,	  perhaps	  our	  own	  mothers	  and	  sisters,	  or	  ourselves.	  We	  need	  a	  way	  to	  explain	  why	  these	  individuals	  deserve	  more,	  why	  their	  devoting	  their	  lives	  to	  others,	  while	  admirable,	  is	  still	  a	  sort	  of	  servility	  to	  be	  avoided.	  	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  against	  Cudd	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  harms	  of	  oppression,	  an	  oppressed	  person	  is	  not	  likely	  to	  understand	  herself	  as	  a	  member	  of	  an	  oppressed	  social	  group	  to	  whom	  she	  owes	  resistance.	  So	  she	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  have	  the	  kind	  of	  motivation	  to	  resist	  her	  oppression	  that	  Cudd	  thinks	  is	  obligatory-­‐	  the	  motivation	  to	  resist	  her	  oppression	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  other	  oppressed	  persons.	  As	  Cudd	  herself	  notes,	  the	  oppressed	  tend	  not	  to	  understand	  their	  own	  oppression,	  so	  how	  can	  they	  understand	  their	  group-­‐membership	  and	  their	  obligations	  to	  other	  oppressed	  persons?	  Therefore,	  I	  think	  my	  understanding	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  a	  duty	  to	  oneself-­‐	  and	  as	  a	  form	  of	  resistance	  to	  oppression-­‐	  is	  more	  accessible	  to	  the	  oppressed	  person	  than	  Cudd’s	  contractarian	  resistance-­‐for-­‐the-­‐sake-­‐of-­‐others	  approach.	  Understanding	  self-­‐improvement	  and	  resistance	  to	  oppression	  as	  an	  obligation	  to	  oneself	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  lead	  an	  oppressed	  person	  to	  become	  the	  Self-­‐Sacrificer	  or	  Deferential	  Activist.	  After	  all,	  it	  is	  a	  mark	  of	  their	  oppression	  that	  they	  are	  already	  prone	  to	  neglecting	  themselves	  in	  favor	  of	  others.	  It	  is	  necessary	  to	  have	  a	  conception	  of	  duties	  to	  the	  self	  to	  understand	  why	  such	  cases	  are	  morally	  lacking,	  in	  particular,	  why	  they	  are	  lacking	  in	  self-­‐respect.	  	  	  
Internal	  and	  external	  harms	  
	  	   So	  far	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  oppression	  is	  systemic,	  unjust,	  group	  specific	  harm.	  Now,	  more	  needs	  to	  be	  said	  about	  how	  oppression	  harms.	  	  What	  are	  the	  “direct	  and	  indirect	  material	  and	  psychological	  forces	  that	  violate	  justice…[and]	  work	  in	  part	  by	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coercing	  the	  oppressed	  to	  act	  in	  ways	  that	  further	  their	  own	  oppression”	  that	  Cudd	  and	  others	  refer	  to	  in	  their	  accounts	  of	  oppression?28	  	  First	  of	  all,	  everyone	  faces	  internal	  (psychological)	  and	  external	  (material)	  constraints	  on	  the	  quality	  and	  potential	  of	  their	  self-­‐improvement.	  Even	  those	  in	  power	  who	  benefit	  from	  others’	  oppression	  face	  constraints	  on	  their	  self-­‐improvement.	  There	  are	  the	  usual	  constraints	  such	  as	  time,	  and	  our	  commitments	  to	  others.	  Taking	  the	  extra	  time	  to	  do	  some	  carpentry	  or	  yoga	  once	  in	  a	  while	  can	  be	  inconvenient	  in	  our	  fast	  paced,	  busy	  world.	  Many	  of	  us	  fear	  failure	  and	  would	  rather	  avoid	  letting	  ourselves	  and	  others	  down	  instead	  of	  trying	  to	  pursue	  an	  ability	  that	  we	  care	  about	  but	  might	  not	  flourish	  in.	  I	  know	  from	  experience	  that	  facing	  a	  blank	  piece	  of	  canvas	  is	  daunting;	  starting	  a	  new	  painting	  provokes	  anxiety.	  Some	  of	  us	  may	  have	  mental	  illnesses	  that	  prevent	  or	  inhibit	  self-­‐improvement	  in	  a	  very	  similar	  way	  that	  oppression	  does.	  Anyone	  can	  become	  indifferent	  and	  detached	  from	  life	  after	  a	  period	  of	  stress	  or	  frustration.	  It	  is	  always	  tempting	  to	  surrender	  oneself	  to	  pleasure	  and	  comfort,	  to	  allow	  oneself	  to	  be	  dragged	  around	  by	  one’s	  desires	  and	  emotions-­‐	  exactly	  what	  Kant	  warned	  us	  to	  avoid.	  It	  is	  easy	  to	  become	  a	  slacker,	  never	  striving	  for	  progress,	  content	  with	  wherever	  we	  are	  in	  our	  development.	  It	  is	  also	  common,	  when	  we	  find	  something	  we	  really	  like	  to	  do	  or	  are	  good	  at,	  to	  spend	  all	  our	  time	  and	  energy	  cultivating	  it.	  In	  academia	  especially,	  it	  can	  be	  easy	  to	  spend	  all	  one’s	  time	  working,	  as	  though	  with	  blinders	  on,	  never	  to	  explore	  or	  nurture	  other	  capacities	  and	  interests.	  As	  an	  academic	  it	  is	  easy	  to	  neglect	  oneself	  in	  regards	  to	  the	  arts,	  physical	  fitness,	  or	  one’s	  social	  capacities.	  These	  are	  all	  examples	  of	  common	  constraints	  on	  self-­‐improvement	  that	  anyone	  can	  experience.	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  oppression,	  however,	  the	  constraints	  are	  more	  intense	  and	  take	  the	  form	  of	  unjust	  group	  specific	  harm.29	  A	  woman	  in	  a	  patriarchal	  society	  suffers	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Cudd,	  Analyzing	  Oppression,	  26.	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constraints	  on	  her	  self-­‐cultivation	  in	  a	  distinct	  way	  because	  they	  harm	  her,	  “not	  solely	  as	  an	  individual	  with	  particular	  handicaps	  or	  failures”	  but	  also	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  group	  of	  all	  women,	  “whose	  members	  are	  considered	  collectively	  deserving	  such	  treatment”.30	  The	  harms	  of	  oppression	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  kinds:	  External	  (physical	  and	  material)	  and	  internal	  (psychological	  and	  intellectual)	  constraints	  (the	  division	  is	  not	  strict,	  since	  these	  harms	  overlap	  in	  many	  ways).	  External	  obstacles	  on	  self-­‐improvement	  are	  straightforward.	  They	  include	  physical	  or	  material	  constraints	  on	  a	  person’s	  mobility,	  lack	  of	  material	  resources	  and	  opportunities,	  insufficient	  education,	  denial	  of	  basic	  rights,	  poverty,	  and	  even	  occupational	  and	  social	  demands.	  These	  constraints	  can	  cause	  a	  person	  to	  be	  ignorant	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  a	  possibility	  for	  them	  at	  all.	  In	  cases	  where	  they	  do,	  I	  follow	  Hill	  in	  saying	  that	  it	  would	  seem	  wrong	  to	  hold	  them	  accountable	  for	  failing	  to	  develop	  themselves.	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  complete	  ignorance	  about	  the	  possibility	  for	  improvement	  is	  normally	  the	  case	  for	  oppressed	  individuals.	  Many	  oppressed	  individuals	  understand	  themselves	  as	  capable	  of	  progress.	  The	  external	  constraints	  also	  include	  threats	  of	  bodily	  harm	  from	  others	  who	  take	  the	  individuals’	  self-­‐improvement	  to	  be	  threatening	  to	  them.	  Normally,	  when	  oppressed	  individuals	  cultivate	  themselves	  it	  threatens	  the	  authority	  and	  power	  of	  those	  who	  benefit	  from	  their	  oppression.	  Oppressed	  individuals	  tend	  to	  put	  their	  physical	  bodies	  at	  risk	  by	  seeking	  to	  develop	  their	  capacities.	  For	  example,	  women	  in	  abusive	  families	  are	  likely	  to	  provoke	  further	  physical	  abuse	  when	  they	  attempt	  to	  pursue	  a	  capacity	  that	  does	  not	  serve	  the	  interests	  of	  her	  abuser.	  Similarly,	  slaves	  in	  the	  southern	  United	  States	  who	  attempted	  to	  learn	  to	  read	  risked	  being	  whipped	  by	  their	  masters.	  In	  many	  conservative	  countries,	  women	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Hay,	  Kantianism,	  Liberalism,	  Feminism:	  Resisting	  Oppression,	  3.	  	  30	  Hay,	  Kantianism,	  Liberalism,	  Feminism:	  Resisting	  Oppression,	  3.	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who	  jog	  or	  run	  outside	  for	  exercise	  are	  prone	  to	  be	  catcalled	  and	  heckled	  much	  more	  than	  women	  who	  are	  walking	  to	  get	  somewhere,	  because	  the	  woman	  who	  is	  exercising	  is	  much	  more	  threatening-­‐	  she	  is	  outwardly	  displaying	  her	  strength	  and	  her	  effort	  and	  desire	  to	  become	  stronger	  and	  healthier.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  war	  self-­‐cultivation,	  especially	  in	  its	  intellectual	  forms,	  can	  make	  a	  person	  seem	  dangerous-­‐	  a	  target.	  ISIS,	  for	  instance,	  regularly	  executes	  journalists	  and	  intellectuals,	  making	  an	  example	  out	  of	  them	  to	  instill	  fear	  in	  the	  population	  is	  it	  attempting	  to	  infiltrate	  and	  control.	  	  Internal	  constraints	  include	  the	  psychological	  and	  intellectual	  inhibitions	  and	  harms	  of	  oppression	  on	  one’s	  self-­‐cultivation.	  The	  psychological	  inhibitions	  include	  debilitating	  emotions	  and	  attitudes	  such	  as	  fear,	  apathy,	  anxiety,	  shame,	  trauma,	  low	  self-­‐esteem,	  feelings	  of	  worthlessness,	  deformed	  desires	  (when	  the	  agent	  desires	  for	  what	  is	  not	  good	  for	  them,	  or	  is	  “ill	  informed	  about	  the	  true	  nature	  of	  what	  they	  desire”),	  servility	  and	  an	  overall	  lack	  in	  self-­‐respect.31	  These	  inhibitions	  hinder	  one’s	  ability	  to	  find	  incentives	  for	  adopting	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement,	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  even	  regard	  oneself	  as	  worthy	  of	  it.	  They	  make	  one	  more	  likely	  to	  defer	  to	  the	  will	  of	  someone	  else,	  someone	  perceived	  as	  more	  credible	  and	  important	  than	  the	  oppressed	  person	  takes	  herself	  to	  be.	  Moreover,	  if	  an	  oppressed	  person	  does	  find	  the	  motivation	  to	  cultivate	  a	  capacity,	  these	  inhibitions	  will	  make	  it	  extremely	  difficult	  for	  them	  to	  feel	  as	  though	  they	  actually	  are	  making	  progress.	  They	  will	  tend	  to	  attribute	  their	  success	  to	  others,	  or	  to	  luck.	  Moreover,	  when	  they	  have	  setbacks,	  as	  we	  all	  do	  in	  self-­‐cultivation,	  an	  oppressed	  person	  will	  have	  a	  harder	  time	  recovering	  and	  will	  be	  prone	  to	  interpreting	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Cudd,	  Analyzing	  Oppression,	  155-­‐184.	  In	  Analyzing	  Oppression,	  Cudd	  divides	  the	  psychological	  forces	  into	  seven	  direct	  and	  three	  indirect	  forces.	  The	  seven	  direct	  psychological	  forces	  of	  oppression	  are	  terror	  and	  trauma,	  humiliation	  and	  degradation,	  objectification,	  tradition	  and	  convention,	  religion,	  ideology,	  and	  cultural	  domination.	  The	  three	  indirect	  psychological	  forces:	  shame	  and	  low	  self-­‐esteem,	  false	  consciousness,	  and	  deformed	  desires.	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the	  setback	  as	  their	  fault,	  their	  mistake,	  their	  failure,	  when	  it	  may	  be	  neither	  of	  those	  things.	  	  	  	  Oppression	  can	  also	  harm	  a	  person’s	  rational	  nature.	  It	  can	  do	  this	  by	  actually	  constraining	  a	  person’s	  ability	  to	  reason	  and	  form	  an	  accurate	  self-­‐image	  and	  understanding	  of	  the	  world.	  Oppression	  notoriously	  causes	  self-­‐deception,	  false	  beliefs,	  weakness	  of	  will	  and	  an	  inability	  to	  deliberate	  autonomously.32	  For	  instance,	  the	  subjects	  of	  oppression	  tend	  to	  believe	  falsely	  that	  they	  are	  naturally	  inferior	  and	  that	  they	  actually	  deserve	  the	  oppressive	  treatment	  they	  receive	  and	  that	  seeking	  anything	  more	  would	  be	  wrong.	  	  Many	  oppressed	  persons	  are	  ignorant	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  suffer	  harms	  of	  oppression.	  As	  Cudd	  aptly	  puts	  it,	  “it	  is	  often	  part	  of	  their	  oppression	  that	  it	  is	  hidden	  from	  them	  under	  the	  guises	  of	  tradition,	  [or	  convention]	  or	  divine	  command	  or	  the	  natural	  order	  of	  things”.33	  As	  Mill	  observes	  about	  the	  women	  in	  his	  society,	  they	  are	  not	  “slaves	  merely”,	  but	  “willing	  one[s]…	  brought	  up	  from	  the	  very	  earliest	  years	  in	  the	  belief	  that	  their	  ideal	  of	  character	  is	  the	  very	  opposite	  to	  that	  of	  men;	  not	  self-­‐will,	  and	  government	  by	  self-­‐control,	  but	  submission,	  and	  yielding	  to	  the	  control	  of	  others”.34	  	  With	  the	  terrible	  nature	  of	  oppression	  now	  in	  mind,	  we	  can	  see	  why	  philosophers	  have	  been	  tempted	  to	  suggest	  that	  oppressed	  persons	  do	  not	  owe	  it	  to	  themselves	  to	  cultivate	  their	  capacities.	  Requiring	  oppressed	  persons	  to	  develop	  themselves	  makes	  people	  uncomfortable;	  how	  can	  anyone	  be	  obligated	  to	  do	  something	  that	  they	  are	  systemically	  obstructed	  from	  doing	  and	  when	  self-­‐cultivation	  can	  lead	  oppressed	  persons	  to	  suffer	  further	  abuse	  for	  disturbing	  or	  threatening	  the	  power	  structure?	  In	  the	  next	  part	  of	  the	  paper	  I	  will	  explain	  why	  oppressed	  persons	  still	  ought	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Hay,	  Kantianism,	  Liberalism,	  Feminism:	  Resisting	  Oppression,	  123-­‐126.	  
	  33	  Cudd,	  Analyzing	  Oppression,	  198.	  	  	  34	  Mill,	  The	  Subjection	  of	  Women,	  141;	  Hay,	  Kantianism,	  Liberalism,	  Feminism:	  Resisting	  
Oppression,	  3.	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to	  cultivate	  their	  capacities-­‐	  that	  they	  can	  and	  owe	  it	  to	  themselves	  to	  do	  so.	  By	  doing	  so,	  not	  only	  do	  they	  preserve	  their	  self-­‐respect	  and	  prevent	  the	  degradation	  of	  their	  rational	  capacities	  but	  they	  also	  engage	  in	  resistance	  to	  their	  oppression	  at	  the	  individual	  level.	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4	  SELF-­‐IMPROVEMENT	  UNDER	  OPPRESSION	  
	  
	   On	  a	  Kantian	  framework,	  oppressed	  individuals,	  too,	  ought	  to	  cultivate	  their	  human	  abilities	  as	  a	  way	  of	  respecting	  their	  rational	  nature.	  Rational	  nature,	  for	  Kant,	  is	  essentially	  our	  ability	  to	  determine	  our	  own	  goals;	  to	  decide	  for	  ourselves	  (within	  social	  and	  historical	  limitations)	  how	  we	  want	  to	  live,	  what	  kinds	  of	  attitudes	  we	  want	  to	  have,	  and	  what	  we	  want	  to	  do	  in	  life.	  In	  order	  to	  respect	  our	  nature	  as	  end-­‐setters,	  we	  ought	  to	  prepare	  ourselves	  to	  be	  able	  to	  achieve	  the	  ends	  that	  we	  set.	  We	  prepare	  ourselves	  to	  achieve	  our	  ends	  by	  cultivating	  our	  human	  capacities-­‐	  the	  powers	  that	  enable	  us	  to	  actualize	  our	  plans.	  In	  doing	  so,	  we	  treat	  ourselves	  consistently	  with	  our	  nature	  as	  end	  setters.	  If	  we	  did	  not	  intentionally	  cultivate	  any	  of	  our	  capacities,	  we	  would	  be	  unable	  to	  achieve	  ends	  that	  we	  determine	  autonomously.	  We	  would	  fail	  to	  respect	  our	  nature	  as	  end	  setters	  by	  neglecting	  to	  develop	  the	  abilities	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  fulfill	  our	  ends.	  To	  use	  Johnson’s	  metaphor,	  in	  failing	  to	  develop	  ourselves,	  we	  treat	  our	  capacities	  “as	  a	  fixed	  container	  into	  which	  one	  must	  pour	  one’s	  ends”	  as	  opposed	  to	  “an	  elastic	  container	  to	  be	  stretched	  and	  shaped	  to	  fit	  any	  ends	  [we]	  may	  decide	  to	  pursue”.35	  The	  only	  exception	  to	  this	  moral	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression	  is	  when	  the	  oppression	  is	  so	  severe	  that	  the	  individual	  loses	  her	  rationality.	  In	  such	  tragic	  cases,	  the	  individual	  is	  no	  longer	  a	  moral	  agent	  and	  can	  have	  no	  moral	  obligations	  at	  all,	  let	  alone	  the	  obligation	  to	  respect	  her	  rational	  capacities	  by	  adopting	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35Johnson,	  Self-­‐Improvement:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Kantian	  Ethics,	  90.	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The	  objection	  from	  ought-­‐implies-­‐can	  	  
	  The	  view	  that	  oppressed	  persons	  are	  not	  morally	  obligated	  to	  develop	  themselves	  is	  based	  on	  at	  least	  two	  possible	  worries.	  The	  first	  worry	  I	  call	  the	  objection	  from	  ought-­‐implies-­‐can.36	  Essentially,	  this	  is	  the	  view	  that	  oppressed	  persons	  are	  categorically	  unable-­‐materially,	  intellectually	  and	  psychologically-­‐	  to	  develop	  their	  capacities.	  Therefore,	  holding	  them	  morally	  responsible	  for	  doing	  so	  violates	  the	  Kantian	  principle	  ought-­‐implies-­‐can.	  	  The	  second	  worry	  is	  that,	  even	  if	  oppressed	  persons	  are	  capable	  of	  developing	  themselves,	  requiring	  them	  to	  do	  so	  imposes	  too	  onerous	  a	  task	  on	  them.	  Certainly,	  it	  is	  good	  if	  oppressed	  persons	  do	  develop	  their	  capacities,	  and	  they	  have	  good	  moral	  reasons	  to	  do	  so,	  but	  it	  is	  too	  burdensome	  to	  require	  them	  to	  do	  so	  as	  a	  moral	  obligation.	  Therefore,	  self-­‐improvement	  can	  only	  ever	  be	  supererogatory	  for	  the	  oppressed.	  By	  way	  of	  responding	  to	  these	  two	  objections,	  this	  section	  argues	  that	  oppressed	  persons	  can	  and	  owe	  it	  to	  themselves,	  as	  a	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐respect,	  to	  cultivate	  their	  capacities.	  Excusing	  oppressed	  individuals	  from	  this	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐respect	  cannot	  be	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  oppressed	  persons	  cannot	  fulfill	  the	  duty,	  nor	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  it	  is	  too	  onerous	  a	  task	  for	  them	  to	  be	  required	  to	  do	  so.	  Finally,	  I	  want	  to	  argue	  that	  in	  failing	  to	  adopt	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement,	  oppressed	  persons,	  while	  not	  blameworthy,	  lack	  self-­‐respect	  and	  ultimately	  fail	  to	  take	  an	  attitude	  of	  resistance	  to	  their	  oppression.	  	  	  	  	  Against	  the	  objection	  from	  ought-­‐implies-­‐can,	  I	  argue	  that	  oppressed	  persons	  are	  still	  able	  to	  develop	  their	  capacities.	  I	  support	  this	  argument	  with	  two	  claims.	  First,	  there	  are	  examples-­‐	  extraordinary	  and	  ordinary	  cases-­‐	  in	  history	  and	  everyday	  life	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  I	  adapt	  the	  name	  of	  this	  objection	  from	  Hay’s	  discussion	  of	  an	  analogous	  objection	  regarding	  	  the	  obligation	  to	  resist	  oppression.	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oppressed	  persons	  who	  manage	  to	  cultivate	  their	  powers	  despite	  the	  harms	  and	  limitations	  of	  oppression.	  The	  second	  supporting	  point	  takes	  a	  more	  theoretical	  approach	  by	  referring	  to	  the	  Kantian	  understanding	  of	  what	  grounds	  duties	  to	  oneself.	  On	  a	  Kantian	  view,	  the	  oppressed	  person	  still	  possesses	  a	  rational	  will	  with	  absolute	  moral	  worth	  and	  is	  morally	  bound	  to	  treating	  it	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  consistent	  with	  its	  absolute	  worth.	  Respecting	  oneself	  entails	  cultivating	  the	  abilities	  that	  allow	  one’s	  practical	  reason	  to	  fulfill	  all	  sorts	  of	  ends.	  Even	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression,	  refusing	  to	  improve	  oneself	  is	  to	  express	  the	  attitude	  that	  one’s	  humanity	  does	  not	  have	  the	  special	  value	  that	  it	  has.	  	  	  
An	  empirical	  response:	  examples	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  under	  oppression	  
	   The	  objection	  from	  ought-­‐implies	  can	  goes	  like	  this:	  oppressed	  individuals	  are	  systemically	  and	  unjustly	  deprived	  of	  material	  resources	  and	  opportunities	  for	  self-­‐improvement	  and,	  they	  are	  in	  various	  ways	  psychologically	  inhibited	  from	  striving	  for	  it.	  Sometimes	  they	  are	  even	  prevented	  from	  seeing	  self-­‐	  improvement	  as	  a	  viable	  option	  for	  them	  at	  all.	  Often,	  they	  believe	  strongly	  that	  they	  are	  by	  nature	  inferior	  and	  have	  no	  capacities	  worth	  cultivating	  except	  insofar	  as	  they	  serve	  others.	  Oppressed	  persons	  tend	  to	  be	  either	  ignorant	  or	  confused	  about	  their	  rights,	  moral	  status,	  and	  potentials.	  Therefore,	  goes	  the	  objection,	  it	  must	  be	  that	  oppressed	  individuals	  are	  literally	  unable	  develop	  themselves.	  Since	  they	  are	  physically,	  intellectually	  and	  psychologically	  constrained	  from	  seeking	  self-­‐development,	  then	  by	  the	  Kantian	  principle	  “ought	  implies	  can”,	  they	  are	  under	  no	  obligation	  to	  improve	  themselves.	  	  The	  objection	  is	  problematic	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways.	  For	  starters,	  it	  is	  based	  on	  a	  faulty	  inference	  from	  “oppressed	  individuals	  are	  under	  great	  socially	  enforced	  constraints	  in	  respect	  to	  their	  self-­‐improvement”	  to	  “it	  is	  impossible	  for	  oppressed	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individuals	  to	  improve	  themselves”.	  While	  the	  former	  claim	  is	  certainly	  true;	  the	  oppressed	  will	  have	  a	  difficult	  time	  cultivating	  their	  capacities	  because	  they	  are	  systemically	  obstructed	  from	  doing	  so,	  I	  think	  the	  consequent	  is	  false-­‐	  the	  project	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  still	  accessible	  to	  them,	  despite	  the	  socio-­‐political	  attempts	  to	  compel	  them	  away	  from	  it.	  The	  fact	  that	  a	  person’s	  society	  tries	  to	  prevent	  them	  from	  doing	  something	  by	  attempting	  to	  manipulate	  them	  and	  making	  resources	  unavailable	  does	  not	  make	  the	  task	  impossible	  to	  the	  person.	  Moreover,	  as	  I	  mentioned	  in	  the	  first	  section	  of	  the	  paper,	  the	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  does	  not	  require	  an	  individual	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  developing	  one’s	  talents,	  it	  requires	  primarily	  that	  one	  adopt	  the	  end	  and	  strive	  for	  it	  when	  possible.	  	  	  	  There	  are	  salient	  examples	  in	  history	  of	  oppressed	  persons	  who	  have	  been	  successful	  in	  developing	  themselves.	  Some	  have	  even	  flourished	  in	  their	  capacities	  despite	  their	  oppression.	  Among	  the	  extraordinary	  examples	  are	  Frederick	  Douglass,	  Malala	  Yousafzai,	  Martin	  Luther	  King	  Jr.,	  and	  Epectitus.	  If	  we	  want	  to	  put	  these	  aside	  as	  rare	  cases,	  there	  are	  countless	  examples	  from	  ordinary	  life	  as	  well;	  examples	  of	  people	  we	  know	  and	  interact	  with	  daily	  who	  have	  succeeded	  in	  developing	  themselves	  despite	  their	  oppression.	  Consider	  the	  single	  Latina	  mother	  of	  three	  who	  juggles	  two	  jobs	  and	  struggles	  to	  raise	  her	  family	  but	  still	  manages	  to	  write	  poetry	  in	  the	  evenings.	  Consider	  the	  woman	  who,	  against	  the	  will	  of	  her	  abusive	  husband,	  secretly	  lifts	  weights	  because	  it	  makes	  her	  feel	  good,	  strong,	  and	  healthy	  and	  helps	  her	  cope	  with	  stress	  and	  adversity.	  Consider	  the	  African	  American	  janitor	  at	  a	  low	  income	  school	  who	  cultivates	  his	  capacity	  as	  a	  friend	  and	  mentor	  by	  trying	  to	  reduce	  bullying	  on	  campus,	  providing	  guidance	  and	  support	  to	  students	  in	  crisis,	  and	  encouraging	  students	  to	  believe	  in	  themselves.	  Consider	  the	  youth,	  especially	  the	  young	  women	  all	  over	  the	  Middle	  East	  who	  are	  persistently	  discouraged	  by	  their	  families	  and	  society	  from	  questioning	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traditional	  values,	  restricted	  even	  from	  forming	  their	  own	  preferences,	  likes	  and	  dislikes,	  and	  above	  all,	  from	  voicing	  their	  opinions;	  and	  yet,	  despite	  the	  risks,	  they	  still	  find	  avenues	  for	  self-­‐expression	  and	  cultivation	  through	  the	  arts,	  intellectual	  pursuits,	  and	  other	  social	  and	  physical	  activities.	  Consider	  the	  numerous	  academics	  and	  activists	  from	  minority	  backgrounds;	  the	  Arab	  Feminist	  writers,	  historians,	  journalists,	  artists	  and	  sociologists	  Nawal	  El-­‐Saadawi,	  Mona	  Eltahawy,	  Ayaan	  Hirsi	  Ali,	  Leila	  Ahmed	  and	  Fatima	  Mernissi,	  who	  stand	  up	  against	  social	  injustices	  in	  their	  culture	  and	  religion,	  who	  educate	  and	  inspire	  others	  about	  the	  different	  forms	  of	  oppression	  despite	  the	  regular	  threats	  of	  violence	  they	  receive	  from	  those	  in	  power,	  tyrants,	  fundamentalists,	  patriarchs	  and	  anti-­‐intellectuals,	  who	  are	  threatened	  by	  their	  work	  and	  want	  to	  keep	  them	  repressed,	  their	  stories	  unheard,	  their	  voices	  silent.	  Slaves	  can	  and	  have	  historically	  been	  known	  to	  spend	  their	  time	  in	  enslavement	  teaching	  themselves	  to	  read,	  perfecting	  their	  craft,	  taking	  up	  arts,	  planning	  for	  their	  escape,	  practicing	  African	  traditions,	  and	  educating	  young	  slaves	  about	  their	  heritage.	  In	  doing	  so,	  African	  slaves	  determined	  their	  own	  identity,	  independently	  of	  interests	  of	  the	  slave	  master.	  They	  told	  stories,	  sang	  songs	  during	  long	  hours	  of	  work,	  and	  kept	  journals.	  Frederick	  Douglass	  is	  an	  excellent	  example	  among	  numerous	  cases	  of	  self-­‐cultivation	  under	  slavery.	  As	  a	  child,	  Douglass	  secretly	  learned	  to	  read	  by	  observing	  white	  children,	  stealing	  newspapers,	  political	  pamphlets,	  books	  and	  other	  reading	  material	  that	  belonged	  to	  the	  white	  men	  under	  whom	  he	  worked.	  As	  a	  result	  of	  his	  self-­‐cultivation,	  he	  was	  eventually	  able	  to	  escape	  slavery.	  He	  is	  well	  known	  for	  writing,	  later	  as	  a	  free	  man,	  “knowledge	  is	  the	  pathway	  from	  slavery	  to	  freedom”.37	  A	  slave,	  like	  Douglass,	  who	  chooses	  to	  spend	  his	  little	  free	  time	  playing	  the	  drinking	  games	  and	  wrestling	  matches	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  Jacobs,	  H.	  and	  Appiah,	  K.	  (2004).	  Narrative	  of	  the	  Life	  of	  Frederick	  Douglass,	  an	  American	  Slave	  
&	  Incidents	  in	  the	  Life	  of	  a	  Slave	  Girl.	  Paperback,	  pp.	  xiii,	  4.	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the	  slave	  masters	  put	  on	  to	  keep	  the	  slaves	  docile	  is	  morally	  lacking.	  The	  slave	  ought	  to	  refuse	  to	  engage	  in	  these	  activities	  that	  are	  meant	  to	  keep	  him	  docile	  and	  content	  in	  his	  position	  as	  a	  slave	  and	  instead	  pursue	  an	  activity	  that	  serves	  his	  interests	  and	  will	  ultimately	  prepare	  him	  for	  freedom,	  even	  if	  freedom	  is	  not	  in	  sight	  or	  is	  ultimately	  never	  met.	  	  	   Of	  course,	  most	  oppressed	  persons	  cannot	  afford	  to	  speak	  up	  as	  the	  scholars	  and	  activists	  I	  mention	  do.	  And	  most	  slaves	  failed	  to	  cultivate	  themselves	  out	  of	  socially	  imposed	  ignorance	  or	  confusion	  about	  morality	  and	  their	  true	  worth.	  Many	  oppressed	  persons	  do	  not	  even	  have	  access	  to	  an	  education,	  let	  alone	  the	  intellectual	  outlets	  for	  self-­‐improvement	  that	  involve	  reading,	  writing,	  and	  developing	  an	  objective	  understanding	  of	  their	  oppression.	  The	  vast	  majority	  of	  oppressed	  persons	  will	  tend	  never	  to	  come	  to	  the	  clear	  and	  conscious	  understanding	  that	  they	  are	  victims	  of	  social	  injustices.	  However,	  it	  would	  be	  wrong	  to	  write	  self-­‐improvement	  off	  as	  impossible	  in	  these	  cases.	  Based	  on	  the	  empirical	  examples	  alone,	  it	  would	  be	  absurd	  to	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  the	  oppressed	  to	  improve	  themselves.	  Thus,	  maintaining	  that	  the	  oppressed,	  too,	  ought	  to	  cultivate	  their	  capacities	  is	  no	  violation	  of	  “ought	  implies	  can”.	  	  
A	  theoretical	  response	  	  
	   I	  have	  just	  established	  that	  self-­‐cultivation	  is	  at	  least	  a	  possible	  end	  for	  oppressed	  individuals	  because	  there	  are	  examples-­‐	  ordinary	  and	  extraordinary-­‐	  of	  oppressed	  persons	  who	  actually	  succeed	  in	  developing	  their	  capacities	  and	  adopting	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  an	  end.	  Now,	  I	  want	  to	  provide	  a	  different	  reason	  for	  rejecting	  the	  objection	  from	  ought-­‐implies-­‐can.	  The	  reason	  is	  that,	  assuming	  a	  Kantian	  framework,	  oppressed	  individuals	  can	  fulfill	  the	  duty	  because	  despite	  their	  oppression,	  they	  still	  possess	  a	  rational	  will.	  For	  Kant,	  a	  functioning	  rational	  will	  is	  all	  a	  human	  being	  needs	  to	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be	  able	  to	  fulfill	  duties	  and	  to	  be	  bound	  by	  duties.	  A	  person’s	  circumstances,	  society,	  physical	  ability,	  and	  natural	  dispositions	  may	  make	  it	  easier	  or	  more	  difficult	  to	  fulfill	  one’s	  duties,	  but	  for	  Kant,	  they	  cannot	  make	  fulfilling	  them	  impossible.	  Thus,	  as	  rational	  agents,	  oppressed	  persons	  too	  are	  subject	  to	  all	  the	  duties	  that	  are	  grounded	  in	  the	  rational	  will-­‐	  including	  the	  imperfect	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement.	  Thus,	  oppressed	  persons	  are	  as	  worthy	  of	  respect	  as	  any	  other	  rational	  person	  is.	  As	  a	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐respect,	  then,	  they	  owe	  it	  to	  themselves	  to	  cultivate	  their	  capacities.38	  So,	  the	  charge	  that	  it	  is	  not	  an	  obligation	  for	  them	  to	  cultivate	  their	  capacities	  because,	  as	  a	  feature	  of	  their	  oppression,	  it	  is	  impossible	  for	  them	  to	  do	  so	  is	  unfounded	  if	  we	  take	  the	  Kantian	  story	  seriously.	  There	  may	  be	  good	  reasons	  to	  disagree	  with	  Kant’s	  conception	  of	  the	  rational	  will	  as	  the	  only	  thing	  that	  can	  have	  absolute	  worth	  and	  as	  the	  source	  of	  all	  moral	  value.	  Most	  contemporary	  Kantians	  are	  not	  committed	  to	  Kant’s	  teleological	  understanding	  of	  human	  nature.	  There	  also	  good	  reasons	  to	  disagree	  with	  his	  view	  that	  rational	  nature	  cannot	  be	  taken	  away	  or	  affected	  by	  the	  harms	  of	  oppression	  at	  all.	  In	  fact,	  as	  I	  explained	  in	  section	  2,	  one’s	  ability	  to	  reason	  does	  tend	  to	  be	  impaired,	  and	  in	  the	  most	  severe	  cases	  even	  disabled,	  by	  the	  harms	  of	  oppression.	  Oppression	  causes	  false	  beliefs,	  self-­‐deception,	  a	  lack	  of	  self-­‐trust	  and	  a	  tendency	  to	  defer	  to	  the	  beliefs	  and	  will	  of	  others	  in	  its	  subjects.	  As	  a	  result,	  some	  oppressed	  persons	  will	  not	  succeed	  in	  developing	  their	  capacities,	  or	  even	  adopting	  self-­‐development	  as	  an	  end.	  But	  we	  need	  not	  accept	  Kant’s	  metaphysical	  commitments	  to	  see	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  and	  morally	  necessary	  for	  oppressed	  persons	  to	  adopt	  the	  policy	  of	  self-­‐development	  and	  to	  try	  to	  cultivate	  their	  capacities.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  Perhaps	  it	  would	  be	  helpful	  here	  to	  say	  more	  about	  why	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  a	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐respect	  for	  Kant.	  Since	  I	  cannot	  provide	  a	  detailed	  account	  of	  it	  here,	  I	  direct	  readers	  to	  Johnson’s	  helpful	  discussion	  in	  his	  book	  Self-­‐Improvement:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Kantian	  Ethics.	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If	  all	  this	  is	  right,	  then	  the	  oppressed	  person,	  too,	  would	  be	  acting	  irrationally	  by	  not	  improving	  herself	  because	  she	  would	  be	  failing	  to	  develop	  the	  capacities	  that	  enable	  her	  practical	  reason	  to	  be	  effective.	  Since	  she	  has	  a	  rational	  will	  capable	  of	  determining	  its	  own	  ends,	  she	  ought	  to	  treat	  herself	  consistently	  as	  such;	  and	  that	  entails	  taking	  measures	  to	  protect	  her	  rational	  will	  from	  further	  harm.	  By	  cultivating	  her	  capacities,	  the	  oppressed	  person	  prepares	  her	  rational	  will	  to	  be	  practically	  effective.	  She	  prepares	  herself	  to	  fulfill	  the	  rational	  ends	  she	  will	  want	  to	  pursue	  in	  life.	  It	  seems	  at	  least	  intuitively	  plausible	  that	  being	  a	  couch	  potato,	  for	  both	  oppressed	  and	  non-­‐oppressed	  persons,	  is	  to	  fail	  to	  honor	  one’s	  humanity-­‐	  one’s	  ability	  to	  set	  ends.	  In	  order	  to	  properly	  respect	  one’s	  humanity,	  one	  must	  cultivate	  one’s	  human	  abilities,	  “putting	  at	  its	  disposal	  the	  capacity	  to	  achieve	  all	  sorts	  of	  ends”.39	  	  
The	  objection	  that	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  too	  demanding	  under	  oppression	  
	   Someone	  might	  object	  by	  arguing	  that,	  even	  if	  oppressed	  persons	  can	  adopt	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement,	  it	  is	  too	  burdensome	  a	  task	  to	  be	  a	  moral	  obligation	  for	  them.	  While	  self-­‐improvement	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression	  is	  certainly	  heroic,	  it	  would	  be	  unreasonable	  to	  say	  that	  failing	  to	  develop	  oneself	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression	  is	  to	  act	  immorally	  towards	  oneself.	  After	  all,	  the	  objection	  goes,	  oppressed	  persons	  tend	  to	  put	  themselves	  in	  danger	  when	  they	  attempt	  to	  cultivate	  their	  capacities.	  The	  project	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  an	  oppressed	  person	  can	  be	  exhausting,	  victimizing,	  and	  counterproductive.	  It	  can	  make	  an	  oppressed	  person	  the	  target	  of	  retribution	  form	  others.40	  Sometimes,	  failing	  to	  cultivate	  oneself	  can	  be	  an	  act	  of	  self-­‐defense.	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  39	  Johnson,	  Self-­‐Improvement:	  An	  Essay	  in	  Kantian	  Ethics,	  86-­‐87.	  	  	  40	  Hay,	  Kantianism,	  Liberalism,	  Feminism:	  Resisting	  Oppression,	  128.	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To	  respond	  to	  this	  line	  of	  objection,	  I	  argue	  that	  self-­‐improvement	  can	  take	  many	  different	  forms.	  It	  does	  not	  require	  a	  person	  to	  improve	  every	  capacity	  one	  has,	  to	  spend	  most	  of	  one’s	  time	  cultivating	  their	  capacities,	  or	  to	  seize	  every	  opportunity	  to	  improve	  oneself	  that	  comes	  along.	  I	  refer	  back	  to	  the	  Kantian	  classification	  of	  the	  duty	  as	  an	  imperfect	  duty.	  As	  an	  imperfect	  duty,	  there	  is	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  actions	  that	  can	  fulfill	  the	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐improvement.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  “latitude	  for	  free	  choice”	  as	  to	  how	  one	  goes	  about	  satisfying	  it.	  One	  can	  choose	  the	  capacities	  one	  wants	  to	  improve	  (as	  long	  as	  no	  other	  duties	  are	  violated)	  and	  at	  what	  times	  to	  cultivate	  them	  and	  to	  what	  extent.	  So,	  self-­‐improvement	  cannot	  be	  too	  burdensome	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression	  because	  it	  does	  not	  require	  the	  oppressed	  person	  to	  perform	  specific	  actions,	  at	  specific	  times.	  	  	  Moreover,	  as	  an	  imperfect	  duty,	  self-­‐improvement	  essentially	  requires	  adopting	  an	  end.	  It	  does	  not	  require	  a	  person	  to	  maximize	  the	  cultivation	  of	  their	  capacities	  or	  even	  to	  be	  successful	  in	  cultivating	  them.	  Since	  it	  is	  a	  requirement	  to	  have	  a	  certain	  attitude	  regarding	  oneself,	  a	  person	  can	  fulfill	  the	  duty	  without	  being	  especially	  good	  at	  anything.	  As	  Hill	  puts	  it,	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  a	  duty	  to	  “make	  oneself	  worthy	  of	  one’s	  humanity	  by	  becoming	  more	  fit	  and	  ready	  to	  live	  as	  a	  rational	  autonomous	  person…regardless	  of	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  we	  will	  actually	  be	  able	  to	  live	  and	  serve	  in	  such	  a	  world”.41	  An	  oppressed	  person	  can	  become	  more	  fit	  and	  ready	  to	  live	  as	  a	  rational	  and	  autonomous	  person	  simply	  by	  spending	  some	  time	  cultivating	  a	  hobby	  or	  interest.	  It	  could	  be	  anything	  from	  a	  range	  of	  possible	  capacities-­‐	  reading,	  painting,	  writing,	  singing,	  doing	  mathematics,	  improving	  one’s	  memory	  or	  interpersonal	  skills-­‐	  and	  they	  need	  never	  be	  perfect	  or	  successful	  at	  the	  skill,	  or	  to	  cultivate	  numerous	  skills.	  It	  does	  not	  count	  against	  fulfilling	  the	  duty	  if	  in	  cultivating	  one’s	  talents,	  progress	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	  Hill,	  “Imperfect	  Duties	  to	  Oneself”,	  Kant’s	  Tugendlehre,	  299.	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slow,	  materially	  and	  psychologically	  limited,	  difficult,	  or	  occasional;	  and	  it	  does	  not	  count	  against	  the	  duty	  if	  excellence	  is	  never	  attained.	  Lying	  idle	  and	  passive	  to	  the	  sway	  of	  circumstances,	  being	  content	  with	  never	  improving	  oneself,	  especially	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression,	  suggests	  a	  defect	  in	  character,	  even	  under	  circumstances	  of	  oppression.	  The	  point	  is	  that	  everyone	  ought	  to	  make	  an	  effort	  to	  be	  a	  whole	  person,	  so	  to	  speak.	  To	  develop	  oneself	  so	  as	  to	  be	  prepared	  to	  fulfill	  the	  goals	  that	  one	  might	  have	  in	  life.	  	  Moreover,	  the	  duty	  does	  not	  assume	  or	  require	  that	  the	  agent	  live	  under	  any	  particular	  conditions.	  It	  does	  not	  assume	  that	  the	  agent	  enjoys	  the	  rights	  and	  social	  freedoms	  that	  the	  oppressed	  are	  denied.	  It	  does	  not	  even	  require	  that	  the	  agent	  knowingly	  nurture	  their	  capacities	  as	  a	  response	  to	  their	  oppression,	  or	  an	  effort	  to	  reduce	  or	  resist	  it.	  Neither	  are	  there	  specific	  requirements	  on	  the	  time	  a	  person	  spends	  cultivating	  their	  capacities.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  maxim	  is	  adopted	  and	  there	  is	  a	  sustained	  effort	  to	  regulate	  one’s	  actions	  by	  the	  maxim	  over	  the	  course	  of	  life	  and	  no	  other	  duties	  are	  violated	  in	  the	  process,	  different	  actions	  performed	  at	  different	  levels,	  under	  different	  constraints	  and	  circumstances,	  and	  in	  different	  amounts	  equally	  satisfy	  the	  duty.	  	  	   Sometimes	  oppression	  leads	  a	  person	  to	  develop	  a	  capacity	  that	  they	  would	  never	  have	  acquired	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  their	  oppression.	  For	  instance,	  a	  slave	  may	  never	  have	  learned	  how	  to	  build	  houses	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  his	  being	  enslaved	  as	  a	  house	  builder.	  While	  the	  context	  under	  which	  he	  learned	  to	  build	  houses	  is	  indeed	  terrible,	  the	  skill	  of	  building	  itself	  is	  a	  good	  and	  respect-­‐worthy	  skill	  to	  have.	  The	  slave	  can	  come	  to	  respect	  himself	  for	  having	  this	  skill,	  he	  can	  come	  to	  esteem	  himself	  as	  a	  good	  builder,	  an	  attitude	  that	  will	  raise	  his	  moral,	  increase	  the	  quality	  of	  his	  life	  and	  may	  lead	  him	  eventually	  to	  use	  his	  skill	  for	  his	  own	  ends.	  At	  least,	  it	  prepares	  him	  for	  that	  possibility.	  Similarly,	  a	  woman	  in	  an	  abusive	  relationship	  may	  have	  never	  learned	  to	  use	  art	  as	  a	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means	  of	  self-­‐expression	  if	  it	  were	  not	  for	  the	  inner	  turmoil	  caused	  by	  her	  abuse.	  The	  skill	  the	  oppression	  leads	  her	  to	  acquire	  and	  cultivate	  protects	  her	  from	  complete	  servility.	  In	  identifying	  herself	  as	  a	  painter,	  she	  can	  have	  a	  sense	  of	  identity	  and	  value	  for	  herself	  in	  spite	  of	  and	  apart	  from	  the	  forces	  that	  deny	  her	  the	  value	  and	  identity	  that	  she	  deserves.	  Her	  art	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  her	  resistance,	  and	  can	  lead	  the	  way	  for	  her	  freedom.	  	  	  
Self-­‐improvement	  as	  resistance	  to	  oppression	  	  
	  	   I	  have	  been	  trying	  to	  build	  a	  case	  for	  the	  moral	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  in	  the	  context	  of	  oppression.	  I	  started	  this	  section	  by	  addressing	  two	  potential	  objections	  to	  the	  claim	  that	  oppressed	  persons	  who	  neglect	  their	  development	  are	  guilty	  of	  some	  moral	  failing.	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  oppressed	  can	  and	  often	  do	  develop	  themselves	  and	  that	  there	  are	  various	  accessible	  ways	  for	  them	  to	  fulfill	  the	  obligation	  within	  the	  constraints	  they	  are	  under,	  including	  taking	  up	  an	  art,	  practicing	  a	  sport,	  fostering	  a	  practical	  or	  interpersonal	  skill,	  educating	  themselves,	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  idea	  that	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  do	  our	  duty-­‐	  that	  we	  face	  obstacles,	  fears	  and	  aversions	  in	  seeking	  what	  is	  good	  for	  us-­‐	  does	  not	  make	  fulfilling	  our	  duty	  less	  possible	  or	  morally	  necessary.	  Now,	  I	  want	  to	  build	  a	  positive	  case	  in	  support	  of	  the	  moral	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  under	  oppression.	  	  Oppressed	  persons	  ought	  to	  adopt	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  for	  three	  related	  reasons:	  first,	  adopting	  the	  end	  is	  vital	  for	  self-­‐respect;	  one	  cannot	  sufficiently	  respect	  herself	  as	  an	  end-­‐setter	  without	  cultivating	  the	  capacities	  that	  allow	  her	  to	  fulfill	  the	  ends	  she	  sets.	  Without	  making	  the	  active	  effort	  to	  develop	  skills	  and	  abilities	  that	  help	  her	  fulfill	  any	  goals	  she	  might	  have,	  she	  ends	  up	  only	  fulfilling	  the	  goals	  that	  fit	  the	  capacities	  she	  is	  already	  given	  by	  nature	  or	  circumstance.	  As	  Johnson	  put	  it,	  she	  uses	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her	  capacities	  as	  a	  container	  into	  which	  to	  pour	  her	  ends,	  rather	  than	  as	  elastic	  to	  be	  stretched	  to	  fit	  any	  ends	  she	  might	  someday	  will.	  Second,	  self-­‐improvement	  offers	  protection	  against	  the	  harms	  of	  oppression;	  cultivating	  a	  talent,	  skill	  or	  ability	  is	  a	  way	  of	  preserving	  one’s	  rational	  nature	  against	  the	  forces	  that	  attempt	  to	  subordinate	  and	  repress	  it.	  	  Finally,	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  an	  effective	  and	  accessible	  method	  of	  resisting	  oppression	  when	  other	  means	  of	  resistance	  such	  as	  activism,	  forming	  solidarity	  with	  other	  oppressed	  persons,	  and	  opting	  out	  of	  oppressive	  social	  norms	  are	  too	  risky,	  inaccessible	  or	  are	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  viable	  option	  by	  the	  oppressed	  person	  (who,	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  her	  oppression,	  tends	  not	  to	  understand	  that	  she	  is	  oppressed).	  Self-­‐improvement	  is	  more	  accessible	  than	  these	  other	  forms	  of	  resistance	  because,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  as	  an	  imperfect	  duty,	  all	  it	  requires	  is	  adopting	  an	  end.	  This	  entails	  that	  resistance	  through	  self-­‐improvement	  can	  actually	  play	  out	  as	  an	  internal	  process	  of	  recognizing	  that	  one	  is	  being	  treated	  wrongly	  that	  her	  fears	  and	  inhibitions	  are	  largely	  a	  result	  of	  this	  unjust	  treatment.	  Only	  by	  having	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  an	  end	  can	  she	  then	  refuse	  to	  believe	  what	  oppressive	  systems	  are	  telling	  her	  about	  the	  worth	  and	  character	  of	  people	  like	  her.42	  It	  happens	  by	  Moreover,	  it	  leaves	  latitude	  for	  free	  choice	  as	  to	  which	  powers	  to	  cultivate,	  when,	  and	  to	  what	  degree	  to	  cultivate	  them.	  So,	  adopting	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  both	  a	  requirement	  of	  self-­‐respect	  and	  a	  foundational	  means	  of	  resisting	  oppression.	  	  When	  an	  oppressed	  person	  fails	  to	  adopt	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement,	  she	  loses	  the	  means	  of	  protecting	  herself	  from	  the	  harms	  of	  oppression.	  She	  can	  only	  protect	  herself	  from	  being	  incapacitated	  and	  controlled	  by	  others	  by	  cultivating	  herself.	  But	  if	  she	  doesn’t	  adopt	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  an	  end,	  she	  will	  fail	  to	  provide	  herself	  with	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  Hay,	  Kantianism,	  Liberalism,	  Feminism:	  Resisting	  Oppression,	  141.	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skills	  and	  powers	  that	  allow	  her	  to	  create	  and	  fulfill	  autonomous	  plans.	  She	  will	  not	  have	  the	  skills	  that	  allow	  her	  to	  live	  an	  autonomous	  life.	  Even	  if	  she	  never	  succeeds	  in	  developing	  herself,	  even	  if	  she	  never	  becomes	  excellent	  at	  anything,	  merely	  by	  adopting	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement,	  she	  puts	  herself	  in	  a	  better	  position	  to	  understand	  that	  she	  is	  being	  treated	  wrongly	  by	  those	  who	  oppress	  her-­‐	  and	  that	  is	  the	  first	  and	  the	  most	  necessary	  step	  in	  resisting.	  	  	  	  The	  slave	  who	  strives	  to	  cultivate	  his	  capacities	  against	  the	  will	  and	  interest	  of	  his	  master	  inevitably	  strives	  to	  be	  free.	  She	  refuses,	  against	  the	  odds,	  to	  let	  others	  control	  her	  and	  deprive	  her	  of	  her	  self-­‐respect.	  She	  is	  hitting	  two	  birds	  with	  one	  stone,	  so	  to	  speak:	  she	  cultivates	  herself,	  strengthening	  her	  self-­‐respect	  and	  autonomy,	  increasing	  the	  quality	  of	  her	  own	  life	  and	  the	  lives	  of	  her	  dependents.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  she	  engages	  in	  an	  individualized	  struggle	  to	  remove	  the	  manifestations	  of	  oppression	  in	  her	  life.	  In	  teaching	  herself	  how	  to	  read,	  a	  slave	  is	  simultaneously	  cultivating	  her	  capacities	  and	  preparing	  herself	  for	  resisting	  her	  slave	  master.	  She	  prepares	  herself	  for	  attaining	  freedom,	  for	  fulfilling	  the	  ends	  that	  her	  “reason	  might	  some	  day	  use”	  (MM	  6:443).	  By	  cultivating	  herself,	  she	  resists	  oppression	  I	  would	  like	  to	  emphasize	  that	  my	  focus	  is	  on	  oppression	  as	  experienced	  by	  the	  
individual	  in	  her	  everyday	  life.	  I	  am	  aware	  that	  oppression	  is	  a	  distinctively	  structural	  phenomenon	  that	  is	  caused	  and	  perpetuated	  by	  social	  institutions.	  Moreover,	  I	  feel	  strongly	  that	  all	  forms	  of	  oppression	  must	  ultimately	  face	  collective	  political	  resistance.	  Individualized	  resistance	  through	  self-­‐cultivation	  cannot	  replace	  political	  forms	  of	  resistance	  such	  as	  activism,	  fostering	  solidarity	  between	  oppressed	  persons,	  boycotting	  institutions	  and	  opting	  out	  of	  oppressive	  social	  norms.	  On	  its	  own,	  self-­‐improvement	  cannot	  be	  effective	  in	  removing	  oppression.	  We	  may	  even	  have	  a	  moral	  obligation	  to	  engage	  in	  political	  resistance	  to	  oppression.	  However,	  my	  focus	  here	  has	  been	  on	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offering	  self-­‐improvement	  as	  the	  most	  basic	  and	  accessible	  form	  of	  resistance	  and	  defense	  against	  oppression.	  One	  that	  I	  think	  is	  necessary	  for	  any	  oppressed	  person	  to	  live	  a	  good	  life	  under	  the	  constraints	  that	  are	  imposed	  on	  her.	  	  Though	  I	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  argue	  for	  it	  fully	  here,	  I	  want	  to	  suggest	  that	  one	  cannot	  be	  rationally	  motivated	  (or	  motivated	  for	  the	  right	  reasons)	  to	  resist	  oppression	  at	  the	  institutional	  level	  unless	  they	  have	  already	  adopted	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  and	  the	  self-­‐regarding	  attitudes	  it	  entails	  at	  the	  internal	  individual	  level.	  In	  other	  words,	  one	  can	  only	  reasonably	  will	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  forms	  of	  resistance	  like	  civil	  disobedience	  if	  they	  are	  already	  committed	  to	  cultivating	  their	  capacities	  and	  regard	  themselves	  as	  having	  capacities	  worthy	  of	  autonomous	  cultivation	  and	  respect.	  Otherwise,	  individuals	  will	  participate	  in	  political	  resistance	  not	  to	  achieve	  opportunities	  for	  their	  self-­‐cultivation	  and	  the	  self-­‐cultivation	  of	  others	  who	  are	  oppressed	  and	  to	  exercise	  their	  autonomy,	  but	  for	  the	  wrong	  reasons	  like	  the	  desire	  to	  take	  revenge,	  to	  make	  others	  suffer,	  or	  to	  please	  and	  gain	  the	  confidence	  of	  other	  revolutionaries.	  One	  ought	  to	  participate	  in	  political	  resistance	  only	  on	  the	  condition	  that	  they	  can	  maintain	  and	  fight	  with	  self-­‐respect	  and	  for	  the	  proper	  end	  of	  gaining	  deserved	  rights	  and	  freedom.	  	  The	  main	  argument	  in	  this	  paper	  focuses	  on	  oppressed	  individuals	  and	  the	  social	  limitations	  they	  face	  on	  a	  daily	  basis	  against	  the	  cultivation	  of	  their	  capacities	  and	  talents.	  By	  arguing	  that	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  indeed	  an	  obligation	  for	  oppressed	  individuals,	  and	  that	  they	  can	  rise	  up	  to	  the	  task	  despite	  the	  forces	  that	  demoralize	  and	  constrain	  them,	  I	  hope	  to	  show	  how	  individuals	  can	  cope	  with	  their	  oppression	  on	  a	  daily	  basis,	  how	  they	  can	  make	  something	  positive	  and	  meaningful	  out	  of	  their	  adversity,	  and	  how	  they	  can	  still	  resist,	  preserving	  their	  self-­‐respect	  and	  autonomy	  against	  the	  efforts	  to	  subordinate	  and	  demoralize	  them.	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5	  THREE	  PATHWAYS	  TO	  FREEDOM	  	  	   I	  would	  like	  to	  conclude	  the	  paper	  by	  comparing	  three	  action	  guiding	  ends	  or	  ways	  of	  life	  that	  an	  oppressed	  person	  can	  take	  in	  reaction	  to	  her	  oppression.	  	  They	  can	  also	  be	  understood	  as	  three	  distinct	  paths	  towards	  freedom.	  Two	  of	  the	  paths	  are	  extremes	  on	  the	  spectrum.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  middle	  path	  between	  the	  extremes	  is	  the	  morally	  worthy	  path.	  It	  is	  the	  one	  most	  likely	  to	  cause	  real	  and	  stable	  changes	  in	  the	  social	  order	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  bolstering	  the	  self-­‐respect	  of	  its	  subjects.	  	  The	  first	  extreme	  is	  the	  life	  of	  apatheia.	  It	  is	  illustrated	  by	  the	  popular	  image	  of	  the	  Stoic	  sage.	  Apatheia	  comes	  from	  the	  Greek	  “without	  suffering”	  or	  “without	  passion”	  (a-­‐	  pathos).	  It	  refers	  to	  a	  state	  of	  self-­‐control	  and	  utter	  tranquility	  in	  response	  to	  changes	  in	  the	  external	  world.	  Changes	  in	  the	  external	  world	  include,	  as	  Epictetus	  says,	  the	  fortunes	  and	  misfortunes	  done	  to	  one’s	  “body,	  property,	  reputation,	  [and]	  office”,	  all	  of	  which	  are	  “not	  within	  our	  power”	  as	  human	  beings.43	  	  The	  Stoics	  believed	  that	  emotions	  and	  impassioned	  desires-­‐	  like	  anger,	  envy,	  love,	  attachments	  to	  others	  and	  material	  things-­‐	  all	  result	  from	  false	  beliefs	  about	  the	  ontology	  of	  external	  nature,	  which	  they	  took	  to	  be	  deeply	  deterministic.	  In	  particular,	  passions	  are	  the	  result	  of	  falsely	  believing	  that	  a	  person	  has	  control	  over	  what	  happens	  in	  her	  life	  and	  that	  the	  things	  that	  happen	  outside	  of	  her	  mind,	  to	  her	  and	  others	  are	  the	  sorts	  of	  things	  that	  can	  be	  good	  or	  bad.	  For	  the	  Stoic,	  changes	  in	  circumstances	  can	  only	  be	  morally	  indifferent.	  The	  only	  goods	  are	  the	  internal	  virtues	  of	  human	  beings-­‐	  courage,	  temperance,	  wisdom,	  justice	  and	  so	  on.	  Since	  external	  harms-­‐	  including	  death,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Epectitus,	  Enchiridon,	  1.1.	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bodily	  harm,	  restrictions	  on	  physical	  freedom,	  and	  abuse	  by	  others-­‐	  are	  not	  truly	  bad,	  the	  Stoic	  says	  we	  must	  not	  be	  disturbed	  or	  angered	  when	  they	  occur	  to	  us	  or	  to	  those	  we	  have	  relationships	  with.	  Neither	  should	  we	  try	  to	  prevent	  such	  harms	  from	  happening.	  Our	  efforts	  against	  deterministic	  nature	  can	  only	  be	  futile.	  	  In	  response	  to	  her	  oppression,	  then,	  the	  caricature	  of	  the	  Stoic	  sage	  focuses	  entirely	  on	  “living	  in	  accordance	  with	  nature”,	  conforming	  her	  beliefs	  and	  attitudes	  to	  the	  deterministic	  indifferent	  nature	  of	  the	  universe.	  She	  does	  not	  complain,	  speak	  out,	  or	  resist.	  Instead,	  she	  embodies	  the	  ideal	  of	  apatheia-­‐	  complete	  equanimity	  and	  endurance	  without	  internal	  disturbance	  or	  complaint.	  	  To	  get	  the	  full	  sense	  of	  the	  Stoic	  route	  to	  freedom	  through	  apatheia,	  the	  following	  are	  a	  few	  quotes	  from	  Epictetus	  regarding	  how	  one	  ought	  to	  live	  in	  general	  as	  well	  as	  how	  one	  ought	  to	  live	  under	  oppression.	  These	  quotes	  nail	  down	  the	  idea	  that	  for	  the	  Stoics,	  resistance	  to	  oppression	  is	  entirely	  internal	  and	  institutional	  change	  is	  neither	  possible	  nor	  morally	  necessary:	  	  	  
“Such	  was,	  and	  is,	  and	  will	  be	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  universe,	  and	  it	  isn’t	  possible	  that	  things	  
should	  come	  into	  being	  in	  any	  other	  way	  than	  they	  do	  at	  present”	  (Fragments	  8).	  	  	  
“You	  should	  behave	  in	  life	  as	  you	  do	  at	  a	  banquet.	  Something	  is	  being	  passed	  around	  and	  
arrives	  in	  front	  of	  you:	  reach	  out	  your	  hand	  and	  take	  your	  share	  politely.	  It	  passes:	  don’t	  
try	  to	  hold	  it	  back.	   It	  has	  yet	  to	  reach	  you:	  don’t	  project	  your	  desire	  towards	   it,	  but	  wait	  
until	  it	  arrives	  in	  front	  of	  you.	  So	  act	  likewise	  with	  regard	  to	  your	  children,	  to	  your	  wife,	  to	  
public	  office,	   to	   riches	  and	   the	   time	  will	   come	  when	  you’re	  worthy	   to	  have	  a	   seat	  at	   the	  
banquets	  of	  the	  gods.	  And	  if	  you	  don’t	  even	  take	  these	  things	  when	  they’re	  in	  front	  of	  you,	  
but	  view	  them	  with	  contempt,	  then	  you’ll	  not	  only	  share	  in	  the	  banquets	  of	  the	  gods,	  but	  
also	  in	  their	  rule”	  (Enchiridon	  15).	  	  
	  
“Remember	   that	  what	   insults	   you	   isn’t	   the	  person	  who	  abuses	   you	  or	   hits	   you,	   but	   your	  
judgment	  that	  such	  people	  are	  insulting	  you.	  So	  whenever	  anyone	  irritates	  you,	  recognize	  
that	  it	  is	  your	  opinion	  that	  has	  irritated	  you”	  (Enchiridon	  20).	  	  
	  
	  “’My	  brother	  is	  wronging	  me’.	  Very	  well,	  maintain	  the	  relation	  that	  you	  have	  towards	  him;	  
don’t	  look	  to	  what	  he	  is	  doing,	  but	  to	  what	  you	  must	  do	  if	  you	  are	  to	  keep	  your	  choice	  in	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harmony	  with	  nature.	  For	  no	  one	  will	  cause	  you	  harm	  if	  you	  don’t	  wish	  it;	  you’ll	  have	  been	  
harmed	  only	  when	  you	  suppose	  that	  you’ve	  been	  harmed”	  (Enchiridon	  30).	  	  
	  
	   While	  the	  Stoics	  are	  fascinating	  and	  extremely	  influential,	  especially	  in	  therapeutic	  practice	  today,	  I	  find	  the	  life	  of	  apatheia	  in	  response	  to	  one’s	  oppression	  morally	  lacking.	  The	  fault	  is	  the	  caricature	  of	  the	  Stoic	  does	  not	  recognize	  oppression	  as	  a	  real	  injustice	  that	  ought	  to	  be	  actively	  resisted	  and	  removed;	  she	  is	  bound	  to	  reinforce	  and	  allow	  oppressive	  social	  harms	  to	  continue.	  While	  Stoicism	  might	  help	  one	  cope	  and	  rise	  above	  the	  emotional	  turmoil	  that	  can	  come	  as	  a	  result	  of	  oppression,	  I	  think	  the	  oppressed	  are	  entitled	  to	  feelings	  of	  anger	  and	  frustration	  with	  authority.	  Moreover,	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  openly	  recognized	  as	  subjects	  of	  systemic	  external	  and	  internal	  harm.	  Stoicism	  would	  seem	  to	  reinforce	  the	  debilitating	  tendency	  to	  feel	  that	  one	  has	  no	  control	  over	  their	  life	  and	  that	  their	  efforts	  for	  independence	  would	  be	  futile.	  Fatalism	  is	  far	  too	  common,	  even	  in	  today’s	  world,	  and	  especially	  among	  the	  oppressed.	  I	  think	  it	  is	  harmful,	  it	  makes	  the	  oppressed	  docile	  and	  further	  inhibits	  their	  progress.	  Moreover,	  the	  Stoic	  attitude	  seems,	  at	  least	  intuitively,	  to	  discourage	  political	  forms	  of	  resistance	  like	  activism	  and	  civil	  disobedience	  and	  cannot	  be	  relied	  upon	  as	  a	  foundation	  for	  social	  change.	  If	  the	  harms	  of	  oppression	  are	  not	  real,	  if	  they	  are	  only	  the	  products	  of	  our	  false	  judgments	  about	  the	  natural	  order,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  act	  to	  change	  the	  norms	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  oppression.	  In	  sum,	  Stoic	  apatheia	  is	  not	  the	  appropriate	  attitude	  in	  response	  to	  oppression	  because,	  while	  it	  may	  be	  promising	  in	  preserving	  the	  oppressed	  person’s	  self-­‐respect	  and	  in	  allowing	  them	  to	  internally	  rise	  above	  their	  oppression,	  it	  cannot	  be	  relied	  on	  for	  social	  change	  and	  cannot	  help	  the	  oppressed	  person	  plan	  an	  escape	  from	  her	  oppression,	  or	  even	  to	  feel	  strongly	  that	  the	  harm	  done	  by	  one’s	  oppressor	  are	  real	  and	  grave	  harms.	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Now	  lets	  move	  on	  to	  an	  alternative	  path	  to	  freedom,	  to	  the	  second	  extreme.	  It	  is	  the	  life	  of	  reckless	  rebellion.	  I	  have	  two	  examples	  to	  illustrate	  this	  kind	  of	  life.	  The	  second	  example	  is	  modeled	  on	  the	  first	  and	  is	  more	  relevant	  to	  the	  social	  injustice	  of	  oppression.	  However,	  I	  find	  it	  helpful	  to	  include	  the	  first	  example	  because	  it	  really	  brings	  out	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  the	  second	  example	  is	  morally	  lacking.	  On	  to	  the	  first	  example.	  The	  life	  of	  reckless	  rebellion	  is	  well	  illustrated	  by	  the	  familiar	  stereotype	  of	  the	  rebellious	  teenager.	  He	  takes	  any	  opportunity	  to	  rebel	  against	  his	  parents	  and	  his	  society’s	  norms-­‐	  taking	  drugs,	  getting	  a	  tattoo,	  sneaking	  out	  of	  the	  house	  at	  night,	  skipping	  classes,	  breaking	  curfew,	  listening	  to	  angry	  music,	  dying	  his	  hair	  green,	  and	  so	  on.	  He	  is	  motivated	  by	  anger	  and	  the	  retributive	  urge	  to	  express	  that	  he	  has	  full	  control	  of	  his	  life	  despite	  the	  efforts	  of	  his	  school,	  family	  and	  society	  to	  constrain	  him.	  He	  takes	  action	  against	  authority	  without	  calculation,	  even	  when	  his	  acts	  of	  resistance	  result	  in	  a	  greater	  and	  more	  oppressive	  effort	  against	  him.	  He	  gets	  grounded	  frequently,	  spends	  time	  in	  juvenile	  hall,	  detention	  after	  school,	  is	  avoided	  and	  bullied	  by	  his	  peers,	  and	  has	  a	  rocky	  relationship	  with	  his	  family.	  While	  he	  is	  not	  to	  blame	  for	  his	  actions,	  I	  think	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  he	  exhibits	  a	  deficiency	  in	  character.	  While	  he	  is	  courageous	  and	  often	  succeeds	  in	  getting	  what	  he	  wants,	  he	  is	  unwise,	  intemperate	  and	  is	  more	  interested	  in	  being	  provocative	  than	  in	  securing	  justice	  and	  gaining	  the	  responsibilities	  of	  being	  an	  adult.	  	  	  	  In	  the	  context	  of	  social	  oppression,	  the	  rebellious	  teenager	  is	  analogous	  to	  the	  stereotype	  of	  the	  man-­‐hating	  feminist,	  or	  the	  life	  of	  misandry.	  The	  man-­‐hating	  feminist	  is	  the	  woman	  who	  rebels	  against	  patriarchy	  primarily	  out	  of	  anger,	  frustration,	  and	  the	  desire	  for	  retribution.	  Ironically,	  in	  doing	  so,	  she	  ends	  up	  embodying	  many	  of	  the	  wrongs	  of	  patriarchy.	  She	  objectifies	  men	  and	  believes	  prejudices	  like	  “all	  they	  think	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about	  is	  sex”	  and	  “they	  hate	  us”,	  which	  get	  in	  the	  way	  of	  her	  making	  male	  friends.	  She	  does	  not	  know	  much	  about	  the	  history	  of	  feminism	  or	  feminist	  theory,	  but	  she	  still	  seizes	  every	  chance	  she	  gets	  to	  express	  her	  anger	  at	  the	  patriarchy	  and	  traditional	  gender	  roles.	  She	  is	  quick	  to	  blame	  men	  for	  her	  troubles	  and	  believes	  that	  men	  can’t	  be	  feminists.	  She	  regularly	  attends	  protests	  because	  she	  needs	  an	  outlet	  to	  express	  her	  anger	  and	  frustration.	  	  Her	  cause	  is	  just,	  and,	  like	  the	  rebellious	  teenager,	  her	  actions	  might	  be	  effective	  in	  resisting	  patriarchy,	  but	  her	  motivation	  for	  resisting	  leaves	  something	  to	  be	  desired.	  Instead	  of	  being	  moved	  against	  patriarchy	  by	  the	  desire	  for	  justice,	  peace,	  equality	  and	  mutual	  understanding	  between	  the	  sexes,	  and	  the	  freedom	  to	  cultivate	  herself,	  she	  is	  moved	  by	  the	  desire	  to	  provoke	  and	  anger	  authority.	  Unlike	  the	  Stoic,	  the	  man-­‐hating	  feminist	  has	  a	  reliable	  way	  of	  bringing	  about	  social	  change.	  Yet,	  she	  does	  not	  act	  with	  morally	  and	  her	  resistance	  is	  hateful	  and	  hate-­‐inspiring.	  Not	  only	  is	  this	  route	  to	  freedom	  counterproductive	  and	  undignified,	  but	  it	  is	  also	  costly	  and	  inaccessible	  to	  most	  oppressed	  persons,	  especially	  those	  who	  tend,	  as	  a	  mark	  of	  their	  oppression,	  to	  be	  highly	  self-­‐doubtful,	  anxious,	  careful	  and	  are	  not	  naturally	  disposed	  to	  have	  the	  feelings	  and	  personality	  that	  the	  man-­‐hating	  feminist	  flaunts.	  	  	  So	  far	  we	  have	  seen	  two	  extreme	  reactions	  to	  oppression.	  I	  argued	  that	  the	  first	  is	  morally	  lacking	  because	  while	  it	  may	  preserve	  self-­‐respect,	  it	  does	  not	  recognize	  that	  the	  harms	  of	  oppression	  are	  real,	  which	  means	  that	  it	  cannot	  play	  a	  foundational	  role	  in	  bringing	  about	  social	  change.	  The	  second	  extreme	  reaction	  to	  oppression	  that	  I	  described	  has	  no	  problem	  pushing	  the	  buttons	  of	  social	  change,	  but	  it	  is	  wrongheaded,	  lacks	  self-­‐respect	  and	  tends	  to	  inspire	  hatred.	  Now	  I	  want	  to	  propose	  a	  middle	  route	  between	  these	  extremes	  as	  the	  morally	  superior	  reaction	  to	  one’s	  oppression	  and	  pathway	  to	  freedom.	  The	  middle	  route	  is	  superior	  because	  makes	  possible	  both	  self-­‐respect	  and	  concrete	  social	  change.	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The	  middle	  route	  says	  “knowledge	  is	  the	  pathway	  from	  slavery	  to	  freedom”.44	  It	  is	  the	  route	  of	  life-­‐long	  striving	  for	  the	  cultivation	  of	  one’s	  capacities	  in	  preparation	  for	  fulfilling	  the	  autonomous	  ends	  that	  a	  person	  might	  one	  day	  choose.	  	  This	  route	  is	  nicely	  illustrated	  by	  the	  extraordinary	  life	  of	  Frederick	  Douglass.	  Like	  Epictetus,	  Douglass	  was	  born	  a	  slave.	  After	  multiple	  unsuccessful	  attempts,	  Douglass	  escaped	  slavery	  at	  age	  20.	  He	  went	  on	  to	  become	  a	  great	  author,	  orator	  and	  leader	  of	  the	  abolitionist	  movement.	  But	  his	  success	  all	  started	  in	  small	  efforts	  to	  cultivate	  himself.	  At	  age	  12,	  Douglass	  secretly	  began	  to	  teach	  himself	  to	  read	  and	  write.	  He	  learned	  by	  observing	  white	  children,	  stealing	  newspapers,	  political	  pamphlets,	  books	  and	  other	  reading	  material,	  anything	  he	  could	  get	  his	  hands	  on.	  Through	  this	  process,	  he	  soon	  came	  to	  the	  realization	  that	  his	  enslavement	  was	  unjust.	  His	  successful	  escape	  from	  slavery	  and	  his	  success	  in	  building	  a	  stable	  and	  flourishing	  life	  after	  his	  escape	  was	  ultimately	  a	  result	  of	  slow	  and	  incremental	  progress	  in	  improving	  his	  capacities.	  	  Douglass’	  life	  is	  extraordinary.	  There	  is	  no	  doubt	  that	  he	  goes	  above	  and	  beyond	  what	  is	  required	  by	  the	  Kantian	  duty	  of	  self-­‐improvement.	  The	  kind	  of	  reaction	  to	  one’s	  oppression	  I	  want	  to	  convey	  here	  is	  also	  exemplified	  by	  the	  lives	  of	  ordinary	  people	  we	  know,	  friends	  and	  colleagues	  we	  all	  have;	  people	  who	  manage	  to	  be	  extremely	  resourceful	  and	  successful	  in	  cultivating	  themselves	  despite	  their	  struggles	  with	  oppression.	  In	  doing	  so,	  they	  often	  come	  to	  escape	  it	  or	  lessen	  its	  harms.	  Moreover,	  by	  cultivating	  themselves,	  they	  prove	  that	  they	  are	  not	  to	  be	  defined	  by	  their	  oppression;	  they	  are	  more	  than	  what	  the	  oppressive	  institutions	  want	  to	  make	  of	  them.	  These	  people	  are	  able	  to	  separate	  themselves	  from	  the	  identity	  imposed	  on	  them	  by	  their	  oppression	  by	  creating	  a	  different	  identity	  through	  the	  cultivation	  of	  their	  capacities.	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There	  are	  numerous	  examples	  of	  such	  people:	  Consider	  the	  woman	  whose	  husband	  refuses	  to	  allow	  her	  to	  get	  a	  job	  and	  for	  whom	  divorce	  is	  not	  an	  option.	  She	  works	  her	  way	  up	  to	  employment	  against	  his	  will	  by	  starting	  small:	  taking	  classes	  at	  the	  local	  art	  center	  and	  eventually	  becoming	  employed	  as	  an	  art	  teacher.	  Consider	  the	  young	  homosexual	  male	  living	  in	  a	  conservative	  society	  who	  takes	  up	  physical	  exercise	  and	  meditation	  to	  relieve	  anxiety	  and	  boost	  his	  self-­‐confidence	  in	  spite	  of	  abuse	  at	  home	  and	  school.	  Consider	  the	  slaves	  on	  plantations	  in	  the	  south	  who	  cultivated	  themselves	  by	  singing	  slave	  songs,	  creating	  and	  preserving	  their	  own	  African	  identity,	  rejecting	  the	  identity	  imposed	  on	  them	  by	  their	  enslavement.	  Consider	  the	  woman	  who	  is	  prohibited	  from	  voicing	  her	  views	  and	  turns	  to	  art	  to	  express	  herself,	  perhaps	  even	  more	  effectively	  than	  she	  could	  ever	  do	  with	  words.	  	  The	  middle	  route	  I	  have	  been	  describing	  is	  superior	  because	  not	  only	  does	  it	  secure	  self-­‐respect,	  but	  it	  also	  has	  potential	  to	  cause	  real	  and	  lasting	  changes	  in	  one’s	  oppressive	  situation.	  As	  I	  argued	  earlier,	  self-­‐improvement	  under	  oppression	  is	  inevitably	  resistance	  and,	  as	  it	  did	  with	  Frederick	  Douglass,	  can	  incrementally	  lead	  to	  freedom.	  But	  unlike	  the	  resistance	  of	  the	  reckless	  rebel,	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  not	  resistance	  for	  its	  own	  sake.	  Adopting	  the	  end	  of	  self-­‐improvement	  is	  true	  to	  the	  ideal	  goal	  of	  activism-­‐	  it	  seeks	  to	  establish	  freedom	  and	  justice.	  Its	  aim	  is	  to	  build	  and	  protect	  the	  ability	  and	  freedom	  to	  fulfill	  one’s	  plans	  and	  rational	  ends.	  	  The	  reckless	  rebel	  neglects	  the	  care	  and	  understanding	  required	  to	  secure	  a	  stable	  and	  moral	  life.	  She	  tends	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  desire	  for	  revenge	  and	  to	  inflict	  suffering	  on	  the	  oppressor	  and	  is	  lacking	  in	  self-­‐respect.	  The	  Stoic	  who	  strives	  for	  
apatheia	  in	  response	  to	  her	  oppression	  is	  likely	  not	  to	  fight	  back	  externally	  and	  cannot	  cause	  real	  social	  and	  institutional	  change.	  The	  middle	  ground,	  the	  life	  of	  self-­‐improvement,	  however,	  seems	  most	  promising	  in	  both	  securing	  self-­‐respect	  and	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causing	  concrete	  social	  change.	  Through	  the	  cultivation	  of	  the	  mind,	  body,	  and	  spirit,	  the	  middle	  route	  gives	  its	  subjects	  both	  the	  internal	  and	  external	  power	  to	  flourish	  under	  the	  challenges	  of	  an	  oppressed	  life,	  promising	  to	  lead	  the	  way	  to	  a	  true	  and	  stable	  freedom.	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